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INTRODUCTION

In most American jurisdictions' each tortfeasor whose acts or
omissions combine with those of other tortfeasors to cause an indivisible harm may be held jointly and severally liable for the entire damage. 2 The doctrine of joint and several liability thus allows a plaintiff to
elect whether to sue one or all of the joint tortfeasors. In either case,
the plaintiff can recover the entire loss. If a plaintiff chooses to sue
more than one of the tortfeasors and receives a judgment against them,
each defendant is individually liable for the whole judgment. 3 Thus,
even though the plaintiff is entitled to only one total recovery, the
plaintiff can select which tortfeasors to sue and who must pay the
judgment. If a defendant is forced to pay more than his or her actual
share of the liability, the defendant has no recourse against the other

1. See infra notes 122-23 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdictions which
have abolished or limited joint and several liability).
2. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 47, at 328 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].

3. Id. at 328-30.
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tortfeasors unless
the jurisdiction affords defendants a right of
4
contribution.
Contribution has been defined as "the right enjoyed by a person
who is jointly liable with others and has paid more than his proper
share in discharge of the joint liability, to force them to reimburse him
to the extent of their liability." 5 Contribution is typically viewed as "an
equitable doctrine based on principles of fundamental justice."' Nevertheless, early courts developed a general rule against contribution
which was followed by the great majority of American courts until the
1970s." The common-law rule prohibiting contribution is more a mistake of history than a well-reasoned legal principle,8 however, and has
received severe criticism in the last half century9 for of its "lack of

sense and justice."' Consequently, the overwhelming majority of juris1
dictions now allow some form of contribution.
Until 1988, South Carolina followed the old common-law rule
prohibiting contribution among joint tortfeasors. 1" The South Carolina
Supreme Court clearly defined the pre-1988 state of the law of contribution in Brown v.Southern Railway Co.,"3 stating, "the rule of law [in
South Carolina] is that one of the two joint wrongdoers can have no
contribution from the other."' 4 Thus, in South Carolina, a joint
tortfeasor could have been required to pay an entire judgment while
other tortfeasors paid nothing. 5 In 1988, however, the South Carolina
General Assembly enacted the South Carolina Uniform Contribution

4. See infra notes 112-35 and accompanying text.
5. Lit Bros. v. Goodman, 144 Pa. Super. 43, 47, 18 A.2d 519, 521 (1941).

6. Vickers Petroleum Co. v. Biffie, 239 F.2d 602, 606 (10th Cir. 1956) (citing Worthington v. Keely, 64 Colo. 91, 170 P. 194 (1917)).
7. See infra notes 17-50 and accompanying text; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2,

§ 50, at 336-37.
8. See infra notes 17-50 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT OF RESTITU§ 102 comment a (1936) ("The rule ...
which denies contribution to one of two
negligent persons ... is explainable only on historical grounds.").
TION

9. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 50, at 338.
10. Id. at 337.
11. See infra notes 101-123 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Adcox v. American Home Assur. Co., 258 S.C. 331, 188 S.E.2d 785
(1972); American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 251 S.C. 507,
163 S.E.2d 926 (1968).

13. 111 S.C. 140, 96 S.E. 701 (1918).
14. Id. at 152, 96 S.E. at 704.
15. As stated by the South Carolina Supreme Court in Adcox: "'Under the law of
this State, one injured by the actionable negligence of two or more joint tort-feasors may
elect that party or parties whom he will sue and may pursue the collection of judgment
procured against any one or more of the judgment debtors.'" 258 S.C. at 338, 188 S.E.2d
at 789 (quoting Travelers Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 249 S.C. 592, 598, 155 S.E.2d 591,
594 (1967)).
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Among Tortfeasors Act,1 6 which abrogated the rule against contribution. This Article will discuss the context in which this Act was implemented and the prominent issues surrounding application of the Act in
South Carolina.
A. Historical Development of the No Contribution Rule
Merryweather v. Nixan17 is uniformly cited as the origin of the
rule barring contribution among joint tortfeasors. 18 The scant report of
this case indicates that it arose from an action for trover brought
against two joint tortfeasors. The two defendants must have acted in
concert because they were joined at a time when joinder was not allowed unless the defendants acted as one in inflicting the damage.1 9
The trial resulted in a joint judgment against the defendants. The
plaintiff, however, levied the judgment against only 'One of the
tortfeasors-Merryweather. Merryweather subsequently brought an action seeking "contribution of a moiety"2 0 from the other defendant. At
trial Nixan obtained a nonsuit, and on appeal Lord Kenyon stated that
"there could be no doubt but that the nonsuit was proper: that he had
never before heard of such an action having been brought, where the
former recovery was for a tort .... ,,21
Later courts seized on the holding of Merryweatherand developed
the rule that denies contribution in both negligence and intentional
tort cases. 22 Initially, the Merryweather rule was limited to intentional

torts. Trover, the conduct in question in Merryweather, was considered
an intentional tort.23 In fact, at the time of the Merryweather decision,
the word "tort" was used to refer only to intentional or willful acts.24
Consequently, many authorities did not view Merryweather as creating
a rule against contribution, but as creating an exception to the general
rule allowing contribution among joint tortfeasors.2 5 In denying contribution among intentional tortfeasors, the courts reasoned that they

16. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-38-10 to 70 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
17. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A comment a (1977); PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 2, § 50, at 336-37.
19. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 50, at 336-37.
20. Merryweather, 101 Eng. Rep. at 1337.
21. Id.
22. See Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. Rv.
130, 130 (1932).
23. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 50, at 336.
24. See Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARV. L. REV. 176, 178 (1898).
25. See id. at 177, 182-83.
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should not assist deliberate wrongdoers in settling their disputes. 2
English law reflects this reasoning and has never denied contribution in cases of "mere vicarious liability, negligence, accident, mistake,
or other unintentional breaches of the law. '27 Similarly, in early American cases, the common-law rule prohibiting contribution was applied
exclusively to cases of intentional or willful misconduct. 28 Subtle

changes in the construction of terms and the liberalization of procedural rules, however, resulted in inadvertent application of the "no
contribution" rule in mere negligence cases as well.2 9
For example, under early common law the term "joint tortfeasor"
referred only to those parties who acted intentionally and in concert
with a common purpose to carry out a joint enterprise.3 Strict joinder
rules allowed the plaintiff to sue, in one action, only those tortfeasors
who had acted in concert, that is, joint tortfeasors.3 Each of these defendants was then held jointly and severally liable under the theory
that a defendant who acted intentionally and concertedly with another
to commit a wrong should be viewed as the sole wrongdoer,3 2 and thus
individually responsible for all the wrongful conduct.3 3 Since the judiciary generally believed that it should not settle disputes between
tortfeasors who acted intentionally and concertedly, the rule denying
4
contribution among joint tortfeasors arose.3
Conversely, when the defendants acted independently, even if
their actions combined to cause a single injury, the plaintiff generally
was required to maintain a separate suit against each defendant.3 5 The
separate trials presumably produced verdicts against the defendants
which reflected their individual degrees of fault. 36 Accordingly, contribution was not viewed as necessary among these defendants.
In the United States, early courts generally followed the English
rules of strict joinder.37 Enactment of the 1848 New York Field Code
of Procedure and similar legislation in other states, however, substantially liberalized the procedural rules.38 These new rules permitted

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 186-87 (quoting Bailey v. Bussing, 28 Conn. 455 (1859)).
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 50, at 337.
Id.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 886A comment a (1977).
See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 46, at 322-23 (citing Sir John Heydon's

Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1150 (K.B. 1613)).

31.
32.
33.
34.

See id.
See id.
Heydon's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1151.
See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2,

§ 50, at 337.

35. See id. § 47, at 325-27.

36. See id.
37. See id. at 325.
38. See id. at 325.
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joinder of defendants who acted independently to cause the same damage. 3' Thus, joinder of defendants who were concurrently negligent became available. 40 Consequently, the courts began to apply the doctrine
of joint and several liability to negligent1 tort defendants who acted
concurrently to cause the same damage.4

The resulting confusion was further intensified by the American
rule requiring one verdict in a case in which several defendants were
joined in a single action. 42 The "one verdict" rule originated from principles of strict joinder, which had allowed only tortfeasors who had acted in concert to be joined in the same action. 43 The rationale for the

rule stemmed from the application of joint and several liability: since
each defendant who acted intentionally and in concert with another
was liable for the entire judgment, separate judgments were not necessary.4 ' Courts widely believed that it was impossible for a jury to apportion damages when defendants had acted concertedly. 45 As was the
case with joint and several liability, however, these rationales disappeared over time, and the courts continued to adhere to the one verdict
rule, even when concurrently negligent tortfeasors were joined in the
same action.'6
The use of the term "joint tortfeasor" to include concurrently negligent tortfeasors and the application of the one verdict rule when
those tortfeasors were joined in the same action resulted in inadvertent
application of joint and several liability to concurrently negligent
tortfeasors. 47 Consequently, most courts continued to apply the rule
barring contribution among wrongdoers who were jointly and severally
liable, even though the rule had come to include concurrently negligent
tortfeasors.4 8 Unfortunately, the origin of the rule that courts should
not aid wrongdoers who act intentionally and in concert was "lost in
sight' ' when the rule was extended to include negligent tortfeasors5 °

39. See id. at 325-26.
40. See id. at 326.
41. Id. § 47, at 328-29.
42. See id.
43. Id. at 329.
44. Id.; see Sir John Heydon's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1150 (K.B. 1613).
45. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 47, at 329.
46. See id.
47. See id.; see also Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy R.R.,
196 U.S. 217 (1905) (first American case to extend no contribution rule to tortfeasors
who were merely negligent).
48. PROSSER & KEETON, § 50, at 337.
49. Id,
50. See id. In addition, at the time of Merryweather, the term "tort" was limited to
willful and intentional wrongs. See Reath, supra note 24, at 178. The broadening of the
definition of "tort" to include negligent acts also has been cited as a reason for the exten-
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B.

DistinguishingContributionFrom Indemnity
1.

Common Law Indemnity

Indemnity has been defined as "only an extreme form of contribution, ' 5"' and the terms "indemnity" and "contribution" are often used
interchangeably. 52 Nevertheless, significant substantive differences separate the two. First, contribution is applicable when multiple
tortfeasors are responsible for a single injury and one of the tortfeasors
53
pays more than his proper share in discharge of the common liability.
The tortfeasor who has paid more than his share may seek contribution from the other tortfeasors to the extent of his overpayment. Thus,
contribution results in allocating the loss among tortfeasors according
to the proportionate share of the liability attributable to each. Indemnity, on the other hand, is applicable when one person discharges a
liability "which, as between himself and the other, should have been
discharged by the other. ' '54 The major difference between indemnity
and contribution, then, is that indemnity shifts the entire loss to another party, while contribution distributes the loss among several responsible parties. 5
Interestingly, indemnity was limited in Merryweather v. Nixan5s
to cases in which the indemnitee was not guilty of obvious wrong. Indemnity, however, unlike contribution, was not limited in its application.5" Indeed, courts have been much less prone to reject a claim of
indemnity, even when the claim is based on the same policy grounds as

sion of the "no contribution" rule to negligent torts. See Note, Tort Loss Allocation
Among Joint Tortfeasors in Alaska: A Call for Comparative Contribution,2 ALASKA L.
REv. 127, 131 (1985).

51. Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134, 138 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 915
(1951).
52. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 51, at 341.
53. See supra text accompanying note 5.
54. Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 370, 104 N.W.2d
843, 846 (1960), overruled in part on other grounds sub nom. Tolbert v. Gerber Indus.,
255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. 1977).
55. See Leflar, supra note 22, at 130-31. The author writes:
If contribution is to be allowed, a joint tortfeasor who has been compelled to
discharge the whole obligation to the injured person will recover a ratable portion of such total amount from the other tortfeasor or tortfeasors, the idea
being one of equalization of what should be a common burden. If indemnity be
allowed, the one discharging the tort obligation is enabled to recover over the
whole amount from the other, on the theory that as between them the primary
liability was on the one against whom indemnity is given.

Id.
56. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
57. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 51, at 341.
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those offered to support contribution.5
The most common form of indemnity arises in contract,59 either
under express indemnity provisions 0 or by implication from general
contractual relationships."1 Indemnity also may arise "by operation of
6 2
law to prevent a result which is regarded as unjust or unsatisfactory.
The latter type of indemnity, known as implied or equitable indemnity, is based upon "a legal fiction founded not upon the parties' intent, express or implied, but upon justice, equity and the doctrine of
unjust enrichment.

' 63

Under early common law, implied indemnity was limited to situations in which the parties had a pre-existing relationship.6" In these
situations an indemnitee free from any personal wrongdoing could
nonetheless be held liable because the pre-existing relationship between the defendants allowed imputation of the indemnitor's wrongful
conduct to the indemnitee.6 5 Thus, a right of indemnity generally has
been recognized in the following situations:
[W]here an employer is vicariously liable for the tort of a servant or
an independent contractor; or an innocent partner or carrier is held
liable for the acts of another, or the owner of an automobile for the
conduct of the driver. Likewise one who is directed or employed by
another to do an act not manifestly wrong, or is induced to act by the
misrepresentations of the other, is entitled to indemnity for recovery
by a third party.6

58. Id. The authors write:
Although the ancient specious argument that the courts will not aid one
tortfeasor against another because no one should be permitted to found a cause
of action on one's own wrong, would appear to apply quite as fully to indemnity as to contribution, the courts have been much more disposed to reject it
where indemnity is involved.
Id. (footnote omitted).
59. See id.; see also Furnish, DistributingTort Liability: Contribution and Indemnity in Iowa, IOWA. L. REv. 31 (1966) (analyzing contribution and indemnity in terms of
contract principles); Leflar, supra note 22 (analyzing contribution and indemnity among
tortfeasors); Sherk, Common Law Indemnity Among Joint Tortfeasors, 7 ARiz. L. REv.
59 (1965) (analyzing contribution and indemnity among tortfeasors).
60. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 51, at 341 (discussing indemnity based on contract principles).
61. See, e.g., Elliott Consol. School Dist. v. Busboom, 227 F. Supp. 858, 864 (S.D.
Iowa 1964) (when subcontractors failed to follow specifications, a contract to indemnify
was implied).
62. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 51, at 341.
63. Ferrini, The Evolution from Indemnity to Contribution - A Question of the
Future, If Any, of Indemnity, 59 CHL B. REc. 254, 255 (1978).
64. Id. at 254-55.
65. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 51, at 341-42.
66. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Over time, however, many courts have expanded the doctrine of implied indemnity and, in certain situations, have allowed indemnity in
favor of parties who are not free from fault.17 For example, courts have
granted retailers 8 or users69 of goods indemnity against suppliers
found liable in strict liability or warranty for a defective product, even
though the retailer or user may have also been negligent to some extent. Additionally, at least one court has granted indemnity to a building owner who negligently relied upon a contractor to make repairs or
70

improvements.

In granting indemnity to negligent parties, some jurisdictions have
distinguished between tortfeasors who are "passively" or "secondarily"
liable and those who are "actively" or "primarily" liable. 1 The New
York Court of Appeals stated the rule as follows:
Where several tort-feasors are involved an implied contract of indemnity arises in favor of the wrongdoer who has been guilty of passive
negligence, if there be such, against the one who has been actively
negligent. The actively negligent tort-feasor is considered the primary
or principal wrongdoer and is held responsible for his negligent act
not only to the person directly injured thereby, but also to any other
person indirectly harmed by being cast in damages by operation of
law for the wrongful act.72
In reaction to the strict rules against contribution, many courts
have extended indemnity to include negligent indemnitees.7 3 These
courts have found a right of total indemnity in situations in which contribution was justified, but was prohibited by the law of the jurisdiction. Consequently, these courts have based their decisions on general
equitable principles which have made it difficult, if not impossible, to

67. See id. at 342-43.
68. See, e.g., Tromza v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 378 F.2d 601 (3d Cir. 1967); Frank R.
Jelleff, Inc. v. Pollak Bros., 171 F. Supp. 467 (N.D. Ind. 1957); Farr v. Armstrong Rubber
Co., 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970).
69. See, e.g., Allied Mut. Casualty Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 279 F.2d 455
(10th Cir. 1960); Crouse v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., 77 Ariz. 359, 272 P.2d 352 (1954); McFall v.
Compagnie Maritime Belge (Lloyd Royal) S.A., 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E.2d 463 (1952).
70. See, e.g., Bond v. Otis Elevator Co., 388 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1965).
71. See PROSSER & KEFTON, supra note 2, § 51, at 343; Comment, Contributionand
the Distributionof Loss Among Tortfeasors, 25 Ari. U.L. REv. 203, 210 (1975) (citing
Banks v. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 224 F.2d 631 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
904 (1955); American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946, 952 (8th Cir. 1950); Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Federal Express, Inc., 99 F.2d 681 (6th Cir. 1938); Seiden v. Savings
& Loan Ass'n, 10 Misc. 2d 720, 172 N.Y.S.2d 403 (N.Y. City Ct. 1958)).
72. McFall, 304 N.Y. at 328, 107 N.E.2d at 471.
73. See Bohlen, Contributionand Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 21 CORNELL L.Q.
552, 568 (1936); see generally Polelle, ContributionAmong Negligent Joint Tortfeasors
in Illinois: A Squeamish Damsel Comes of Age, 1 LOYOLA U. CHL L.J. 267 (1970).
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determine "when indemnity will be allowed and when it will not. 7' 4
Affording a right of contribution in these cases, as opposed to applying
rules of indemnity based on ambiguous equitable justifications, would
increase uniformity.
2. Indemnity in South Carolina
The law of indemnity in South Carolina has evolved in a manner
similar to other jurisdictions. South Carolina has long accepted "[tihe
general rule . . . that there can be no indemnity among mere joint
tort-feasors. ' 75 Nevertheless, South Carolina, like other jurisdictions,
has applied indemnity
in a variety of situations, including cases involv76
tortfeasors.
joint
ing
Courts in South Carolina have always upheld valid indemnity provisions in contracts.7 Furthermore, South Carolina has recognized a
right of indemnity in the absence of an express contractual provision
when "'one person is compelled to pay damages because of negligence
imputed to him as the result of a tort committed by another. . ..
South Carolina courts have held that an employer who is held liable
for the torts of an employee under the doctrine of respondeat superior
has a right of indemnity against the employee.79 In addition, a party
who employs an independent contractor has a right of indemnity for
liability imputed to the party because of the independent contractor's
negligence.80
An indemnitee has no right of indemnity, however, if the indemnitee was personally at fault, separate from any negligence imputed to

74. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 51, at 343.
75. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Whetstone, 243 S.C. 61, 68, 132 S.E.2d 172, 175
(1963); accord Knight v. Autumn Co., 271 S.C. 112, 245 S.E.2d 602 (1978); Adcox v.
American Home Assurance Co., 258 S.C. 331, 188 S.E.2d 785 (1972); Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 249 S.C. 592, 155 S.E.2d 591 (1967).
76, See McCain Mfg. Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 528 F. Supp. 524 (D.S.C. 1981),
rev'd on other grounds, 695 F.2d 803 (4th Cir. 1982).
77. See, e.g., Southern Ry. v. Springs Mills, Inc., 625 F.2d 496 (4th Cir. 1980) (applying South Carolina law); Costas v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 283 S.C. 94, 321
S.E.2d 51 (1984). South Carolina courts generally hold that a contract for indemnity will
not be construed to indemnify against losses to the indemnitee caused by his own negligence unless the intention to do so is expressed in unequivocal terms. See, e.g., Shealy v.
Southern Ry., 287 F. Supp. 713 (D.S.C. 1968); Cox v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 39
F.R,D. 47 (W.D.S.C. 1965).
78. Addy v. Bolton, 257 S.C. 28, 34, 183 S.E.2d 708, 710 (1971) (quoting Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. v. Whetstone, 243 S.C. 61, 70, 132 S.E.2d 172, 176 (1963)).
79. See, e.g., Sky City Stores, Inc. v. Gregg Sec. Servs., Inc., 276 S.C. 556, 280 S.E.2d
807 (1981); Bell v. Clinton Oil Mill, 129 S.C. 242, 124 S.E. 7 (1924).
80. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co. v. Utilities Constr. Co., 244 S.C. 79, 135 S.E.2d
613 (1964).
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him."" Furthermore, in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. Whetstone8 2
the supreme court stated that it would not distinguish between passive
and active negligence to allow for contribution in favor of the passive
tortfeasor:
The ratio decidendi of cases granting indemnity has frequently been

expressed in such general terms as that ... the negligence of the indemnitee was merely passive as compared to the negligence of the indemnitor which was active ....
It would seem that such [a] general
proposition[] . . . will not serve as [an] adequate standard[] to deter-

mine whether or not a tort-feasor guilty of ordinary negligence may
recover indemnity against a tort-feasor guilty of gross negligence.83
Even though the decision in Whetstone appeared to reject the active-passive distinction in determining whether a right of indemnity
exists,8 4 two recent cases indicate that South Carolina courts may over-

look the negligence of an indemnitee when allowing indemnity would
further justice.8 5 These cases appear to be almost a tacit acceptance of
the active-passive rule.
C. Justificationsfor the "No Contribution" Rule
Although the general rule prohibiting contribution among joint
86
tortfeasors is more readily traced to misinterpretations of precedent
than to adoption of well-reasoned legal principles, proponents of the
rule offer several rationales to support its continued application. Each
of these arguments, however, is either inapplicable in modern tort law
or outweighed by the potential injustice created by the rule.

81. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 243 S.C. at 70, 132 S.E.2d at 176; Addy, 257 S.C.
at 34, 183 S.E.2d at 710.
82. 243 S.C. 61, 132 S.E.2d 172 (1963).
83. Id. at 70, 132 S.E.2d at 176 (citations omitted).
84. See Utilities Constr. Co., 244 S.C. at 87-88, 135 S.E.2d at 616-17 (construing
Whetstone as rejecting the active-passive distinction in determining whether a right of
indemnity exists).
85. See McCain Mfg. Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 695 F.2d 803 (4th Cir. 1982)
(court applying South Carolina law, allowed plaintiff-sellers claim for indemnity against
machine manufacturer after seller paid judgment for negligence, saying any negligence
on part of seller was merely passive); Stuck v. Pioneer Logging Mach., Inc., 279 S.C. 22,
24-25, 301 S.E.2d 552, 553 (1983) (court distinguished this case from other indemnity
cases denying relief to a negligent party on basis that the buyer of the vehicle and the
seller were not joint tortfeasors and granted buyer a right of indemnity against seller,
even though buyer was negligent in failing to inspect vehicle for defects). See generally
Gray & Catt, The Law of Indemnity in South Carolina,41 S.C.L. REV. 605, 613-14 (1990)
(discussing McCain and Stuck as they relate to the status of the active-passive rule in
South Carolina).
86. See supra notes 17-50 and accompanying text.
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1. The No Contribution Rule Has a Deterrent Effect
The traditional argument proffered in support of the rule against
contribution is that allowing contribution would dilute the deterrent
and punitive effect of tort liability.87 Some courts fear that allowing

contribution would encourage misconduct because tortfeasors could act
irresponsibly, secure in the knowledge that they ultimately would be
liable only for a portion of the resulting award.8
The deterrent argument is persuasive, however, only to the extent
that tort law is intended to be punitive in effect. Therefore, it has little
application in actions that allege negligence and are intended to provide compensation. 9 Professor Bohlen recognized that, for the rule
against contribution to have a deterrent effect, the following three elements must exist: (1) the tortfeasor must know that his actions may
expose him to liability; (2) the tortfeasor must know that if injury results it is partly due to another's misconduct; and (3) the tortfeasor
must be aware of the rule denying contribution." None of these requirements are likely to be met by a tortfeasor who is merely negligent.
Thus, as stated by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
rejecting the deterrent rationale: "To believe that the rule of no contribution will tend to make a careless person careful . . . seems to us
wholly fanciful." 91

In addition, since certainty rather than severity of sanction may be
more important in deterring misconduct,92 the no contribution rule actually may encourage wrongful conduct in certain situations. For example, a wrongdoer may be more predisposed to act if he knows that the
98
victim would likely seek recovery against a more affluent tortfeasor.
2. Courts Should Not Assist Wrongdoers in Settling Their
Disputes
Another argument often used to justify denying contribution is
that the courts should not waste time and resources to assist wrongdoers in settling their disputes.9 4 The purpose of the court system, how-

87. See Bohlen, supra note 73, at 557-69; Leflar, supra note 22, at 133-34.
88. See Peck v. Ellis, 2 Johns. Ch. 131, 137 (N.Y. Ch. 1816).
89. See Bohlen, supra note 73, at 558.
90. See id.
91. George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
92. See Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L.
REV. 949, 960-70 (1966).
93. See Leflar, supra note 22, at 133-34.
94. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Whetstone, 243 S.C. 61, 68, 132 S.E.2d 172, 175
(1962) ("[A]s between joint tort-feasors there is no right of contribution or indemnity,
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ever, is to administer justice. "Justice[, in turn,] involves the principle

of equality, which is violated if, when several parties are involved in
the same fault, one alone bears the total loss.

'9 5

The inequality created

by the no contribution rule becomes even more obvious when one considers that the plaintiff is more likely to select a defendant based on
comparative wealth rather than *comparative culpability."
3. The No ContributionRule Creates Effective Loss Distribution
A third rationale offered for the rule against contribution is that it
keeps wealthy defendants and liability insurers from shifting loss to
97
poorer or uninsured parties, thus creating effective loss distribution.
This rationale is questionable, however, because of the inequality and
resulting injustice created by basing liability on relative wealth rather
than relative culpability.98 In addition, this rationale has no application to cases in which the tortfeasors are equally able to pay."" Furthermore, because the no contribution rule does not prevent the injured
party from seeking compensation from the less affluent tortfeasor, the
loss distribution effect is eliminated. 100
D. Present State of Contributionin the United States
In the United States the great majority of jurisdictions have recognized that the rule denying contribution among joint tortfeasors was
not well founded and, therefore, have abrogated the common-law doctrine. The main inroad has been by legislative enactment. Seventeen
states have adopted a version of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasor's Act. 10 Another five states have broader contribution stat-

the rule being premised on the doctrine that the Courts are not open to wrongdoers to
assist them in adjusting the burdens of their misconduct, and that the law will not lend
its aid to one who founds his cause of action on a delict."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, § 886A comment a (1979); Leflar, supra note 22, at 134-35.
95. See Turck, Contribution Between Tortfeasors in American and German
Law-A Comparative Study, 41 TUL. L. REV. 1, 10 (1966).
96. See Bohlen, supra note 73, at 558.
97. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 50, at 337-38. If the "loss allocation" argument is deemed to have merit, then the approach of North Carolina, denying only insurance companies the right to seek contribution, should be adopted. See Lumbermen's
Mut. Casualty Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 211 N.C. 13, 188 S.E. 634
(1936).
98. Comment, supra note 71, at 215.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 12 U.L.A. 63 (1955); see ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2501 to -2509 (Supp. 1989);
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-61-201 to -212 (1987); COL. RE V. STAT. §§ 13-50.5-101 to -106 (1987
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utes which provide for contribution, but leave most questions for the
courts. 10 2 Three states have incorporated contribution into their com-

parative fault statutes, 10 3 and in Michigan the legislature passed a contribution statute 0 4 after the Supreme Court of Michigan judicially
adopted comparative fault.10 5
Maine 0 6 and Iowa' 07 were the first states to adopt contribution
judicially. Illinois, 0 s Missouri,10 New York," 0 and the District of Columbia"' also apply judicially accepted contribution. 112 Statutes allowing pro rata contribution in California 1 3 and West Virginia" 4 have
been subsequently voided by judicial adoption of contribution based
on proportionate fault.
The following states do not recognize a right of contribution: Ala-

& Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 §§ 6301-6308 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.31
(West 1984); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 663-11 to -17 (1988); MD. ANN. CODE art. 50 §§ 16-24
(1986); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231B, § 1-4 (West 1986); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
17.225-.305 (Michie 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. §8 2A:53A-1 to A-5 (West 1987); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 41-3-1 to -8 (1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1B-1 to -6 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 3238-01 to -04 (1976 & Supp. 1989); 42 PA. CONS STAT. ANN. §§ 8321-8327 (Purdon 1982);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-6-1 to -11 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 15-8-11 to -22 (1984
& Supp. 1989); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-11-101 to -106 (1980).
102. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-12-32 to -33 (Supp."1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. 8§
412.010 to -060 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972); LA. CiV. CODE ANN. arts. 1804, 1805 (West 1987);
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-34 to -35.1 (1984 & Supp. 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 113.01-.11
(West 1988).
103. See IDAHO CODE § 6-803 (Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.02 (West Supp.
1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.040 (1988).
104. MICH. Cohip. LAWS ANN. § 600.2925a-d (West 1986 & Supp. 1989), construed in
Mayhew v. Berrien County Road Comm'n, 414 Mich. 399, 326 N.W.2d 366 (1982).
105. See Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979).
106. See Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449, 104 A. 815 (1918).
107. See Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956).
108. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437
(1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
109. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. 1978).
110. Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382
(1972).
111. Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
112. The following states originally adopted contribution judicially but now have
contribution statutes: Louisiana, Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La. 289, 151 So. 208 (1933);
Minnesota, Underwriters at Lloyds v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388, 208 N.W. 13 (1926); Nevada, Wiener v. United Air Lines, 216 F. Supp. 701 (S.D. Cal. 1962) (applying Nevada
law), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S.
951 (1964); Pennsylvania, Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354, 141 A. 231
(1928); Tennessee, Davis v. Broad St. Garage, 191 Tenn. 320, 232 S.W.2d 355 (1950); and
Wisconsin, Ellis v. Chicago N.W. Ry., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 1048 (1918).
113. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146
Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
114. Sitzes v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 169 W. Va. 698, 289 S.E.2d 679 (1982).
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bama, 115 Connecticut," 6 Indiana,"' Kansas," 8 New Hampshire,'19 Vermont, 1 0 and Oklahoma.' 2 ' In Kansas, New Hampshire, Vermont, and
Indiana,"' however, the issue of contribution does not arise because
these states have abolished joint and several liability. A plaintiff in
these states can collect only the portion of liability individually assessed against a tortfeasor; therefore, contribution is not needed. Similarly, the doctrine of joint and several liability has been limited in
123
Oklahoma.

II. APPLYING CONTRIBUTION IN SOUTH CAROLINA
In 1939, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
24
Laws drafted the first Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.
The Uniform Act was revised in 1955,"5 and by 1988 seventeen states
had adopted some version of it." 6 Adding to that number, South Caro127
lina adopted the 1955 Uniform Act with few changes.
The South Carolina Uniform Act provides for contribution when
two or more persons become jointly and severally liable in tort for the
same injury to person or property, "even though judgment has not
been recovered against all or any of them." 1 82s Under the Act,
tortfeasors pay a pro rata share, regardless of each party's relative de-

115. See Consolidated Pipe & Supply Co. v. Stockham Valves & Fittings, Inc., 365
So. 2d 968 (Ala. 1978).
116. See Rode v. Adley Express Co., 130 Conn. 274, 33 A.2d 329 (1943).
117. See McClish v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 266 F. Supp. 987, 989 n.5 (S.D.
Ind. 1967). The common-law rule was later codified in Indiana's comparative fault act.
See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-33-1 to -14 (Burns 1986 & Supp. 1989).
118. See infra text accompanying note 122.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. National Trailer Convoy, Inc. v. Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 434 P.2d 238
(Okla. 1967).
122. Indiana's comparative fault act provides only several liability. IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 34-4-33-1 to -14 (Burns 1986 & Supp. 1989), construed in Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Vendo Co., 455 N.E.2d 370 (Ind.App. 1983).
123. Limited application of joint and several liability applies only to cases in which
the damages cannot be apportioned or in which plaintiff is not at fault. See Boyles v.
Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 619 P.2d 613 (Okla. 1980); Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d
1071 (Okla. 1978).
124. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT, 12 U.L.A. 57 (1939) (revised
1955) [hereinafter UNIF. AcT (1939)].
125. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT, 12 U.L.A. 63 [hereinafter UNIF.
ACT (1955)].
126. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
127. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-38-10 to -70 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
128. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-20(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see also UNIF. ACT
(1955), supra note 139, § 1(a) at 63 (containing an identical provision).
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gree of fault.129 Recovery from other tortfeasors is limited to the excess
of actual payment over the paying tortfeasor's pro rata share of liability. 130 The South Carolina Act provides for a limited right of contribution to recover a portion of an out-of-pocket settlement, but the settlement must first extinguish the liability of another tortfeasor.131 Finally,
the Uniform Act expressly excludes intentional, willful, or wanton acts
1 32
from coverage.
In the first decision to discuss application of the South Carolina
Uniform Act, the federal district court in Lightner v. Duke Power
Co.133 held that the Act did not apply to a claim for contribution based
on a tort that occured before the effective date of the Act. The court
noted that the "Act became effective on April 5, 1988, and 'applies to
those causes of action arising or accruing on or after the effective date
of th[e] act.' ,1134 The court held that
a right to contribution, and hence a cause of action for contribution,
arises when the underlying tort giving rise to a common liability occurs. This inchoate right matures into a complete and enforceable
right of action only after a tortfeasor pays more than his pro rata
share of the judgment. 35
Noting the past reluctance of South Carolina courts to apply an act
retroactively when inchoate rights would be affected,13 6 the court refused to apply the Contribution Act to an action based on an underlying tort that occured before the effective date of the Act. The decision
in Lightner is in accord with the view of most states that have considered retroactive application of contribution statutes.1 3 7 Furthermore,

129. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); UNIF. ACT (1955) § 2, at

87.
130. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-20(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); UNIF. ACT. (1955) §

1(b), at 63.
131. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-20(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); Unif. Act (1955) §
1(d), at 63.
132. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-20(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); see also UNIF. ACT.
(1955) § 1(C), at 63 (excluding wilfull, wanton and intentional acts).
133. 719 F. Supp. 1310 (D.S.C. 1989).
134. Id. at 1314 (quoting South Carolina Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 1988
S.C. Acts 432, § 10 (1988)).

135. Id. at 1316.
136. Id. at 1316. The court referred to the South Carolina Supreme Court's ruling in
Schall v. Sturm, Ruger Co., 278 S.C. 646, 300 S.E.2d 735 (1983), in which the court refused to apply the South Carolina strict liability statute retroactively, even though only

inchoate rights would be affected.
137. See Slaughter v. Pennsylvania X-Ray Corp.,
plying Pennsylvania law); Ogle v. Craig Taylor Equip.
F.H. Ross & Co. v. White, 224 Ga. 324, 161 S.E.2d 857
omy Baler Co., 105 Ill. 2d 462, 475 N.E.2d 867 (1985);
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Lightner appears to reflect the view that the South Carolina Supreme
Court would take on the issue.""
A.

Measuring Contribution Shares

Under the South Carolina Act' 39 and in most jurisdictions allowing
contribution, 40 damages are apportioned equally among the
tortfeasors, making each tortfeasor liable for a pro rata share. Under
this "equality is equity"' 4' rule, relative degrees of fault are not considered. Presumably, a principal rationale underlying the rule is that apportioning fault would place a difficult and unnecessary burden on the
courts. Thus, to determine the contribution shares, a court simply divides the judgment or settlement giving rise to the claim of contribution by the total number of tortfeasors.' 4 '
Nevertheless, potential injustice can result from the pro rata share
approach. In Bielski v. Schulze 14 the jury found the party seeking contribution to be ninety-five percent at fault and the other party only
five percent at fault.144 The trial court, however, felt bound to follow
the existing law of the state requiring equal share apportionment and
allowed the plaintiff to recover fifty percent of the judgment from the
party who was only five percent at fault.145 Recognizing the injustice
created by application of the pro rata share rule, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reduced the contribution recovery to five percent of the
damage claim, stating:
If the doctrine is to do equity, there is no reason in logic or in natural
justice why the shares of common liability of joint tortfeasors should
not be translated into the percentage of the causal negligence which
contributed to the injury. This is merely a refinement of the equitable
6
principle.

1
4

Accordingly, a growing minority of jurisdictions have begun to apportion liability on the basis of relative fault, following reasoning simi-

County, 26 Or. App. 645, 554 P.2d 601 (1976); Massey v. Sullivan County, 225 Tenn. 132,
464 S.W.2d 548 (1971); Shiflet v. Eller, 228 Va. 115, 319 S.E.2d 750 (1984).
138. See supra note 134 and accopanying text.
139. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
140. Herndon & Israel, The Law of Contribution,29 PRAc. LAW, Sept. 1, 1983, at 59,
65.
141. PROSSER & KEE rN, supra note 2, § 50, at 340.
142. See Turck, supra note 95, at 28.
143. 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
144. Id. at 3, 114 N.W.2d at 106.

145. Id.
146. Id. at 9, 114 N.W.2d at 109.
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lar to that employed by the court in Bielski. 147 Jurisdictions that apply
comparative fault generally apply comparative contribution principles
as well." 8 Thus, as jurisdictions become more familiar with the application of comparative fault, comparative contribution, which is based
essentially on the same equitable principles, may also gain greater
acceptance.
Another concern involving the apportionment of contribution is
how to calculate contribution shares when one of the tortfeasors is insolvent or outside the jurisdiction of the court assessing the liability. 4
In this situation there are basically two methods of calculating contribution shares-the "equitable rule" and the "legal rule." 5 0 Under the
equitable rule, the paying tortfeasors divide the nonpaying tortfeasor's
share equally among themselves and add the sum to their own
shares.15 ' Under the legal rule, the tortfeasor against whom the judgment plaintiff executes his judgment must assume the nonpaying
tortfeasor's share.15 2 In other words, he cannot seek contribution from
the other tortfeasors for the share of the nonpaying tortfeasor.
The legal rule has one redeeming quality: if the nonpaying
tortfeasor becomes solvent or comes within the jurisdiction, the rule
requires only one suit to recover contribution from him. 53 Nevertheless, the inequities produced by the legal rule within the doctrine of
contribution, a remedy based on equity, have induced almost universal
application of the equitable rule. 54
B. Treatment of Intentional Tortfeasors
As noted earlier, Merryweather v. Nixan, 55 the English case
credited with giving rise to the common-law rule denying contribution
among joint tortfeasors, actually denied contribution only to inten-

147. See, e.g., Little v. Miles, 213 Ark. 725, 212 S.W.2d 935 (1948); Mitchell v.
Branch, 45 Haw. 128, 363 P.2d 969 (1961); Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169 (Me. 1971);
Dole v. Dow Chemical Co. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
Interestingly, the 1939 Uniform Act provided for comparative apportionment "[w]hen
there is such disproportion of fault among joint tortfeasors as to render inequitable an
equal distribution among them of the common liability by contribution. . . ...
UNIF. ACT
(1939), supra note 124 at § 2(4). Additionally, England has comparative contribution.
See Married Women and Tortfeasors Act, 1935, 25 & 26, Geo. 5, ch. 30, § 6.
148. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
149. Comment, supra note 71, at 233-34 n.118.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See id.
155. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
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tional wrongdoers."5 6 Jurisdictions in the United States that now permit contribution among negligent tortfeasors have attempted to preserve the original rationale of Merryweather'57 by denying contribution
when the underlying tort was intentional or when there was a violation
of the law.' 5 8 For example, the South Carolina Act provides that
"[t]here is no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has
intentionally caused or contributed to the injury or wrongful death."'' 9
Some courts have even held that no right of contribution exists under
the Uniform Act when the conduct of the tortfeasors was aggravated
negligence. 60
Substantial authority supports the opposing argument that the equitable policies which form the basis for allowing contribution among
negligent tortfeasors apply equally well to intentional tortfeasors. 161 In
fact, neither the English contribution act 16 1 nor the 1939 Uniform
Act'' distinguish between negligent and intentional torts in allowing
contribution.
One rationale given for extending contribution to intentional
tortfeasors is that not every tort labeled "intentional" constitutes a
moral wrong. s 4 For example, the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that "[t]here is no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor
who has intentionally caused the harm.' 165 The Restatement drafters
recognized, however, that situations exist in which a right of contribution should be granted to an "intentional" tortfeasor. Addressing the
rule against contribution for intentional tortfeasors, the drafters wrote:
This rule has been modified, however, to permit contribution in favor
of one who-is charged with a purely technical tort without any real
intent to do harm, as in the case of one who has intentionally entered
the land of another and so become liable for trespass in the innocent
belief that the land is his own. On the same basis, one who has be-

156. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
157. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A comment j (1979).
158. See, e.g., Carriers Ins. Exch. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 310 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1962)
(applying Virginia law); Nettles v. Alexander, 169 Ark. 380, 275 S.W. 708 (1925); Best v.
Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956).
159. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-20(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988); see also UNIF. ACT
(1955), supra note 125, § 1(c), at 63 (containing a bracketed section not in the South
Carolina version imposing a "wilfully and wantonly" requirement after the word
"intentionally").
160. See, e.g., Hardware Mut. Casualty Co. v. Danberry, 234 Minn. 391, 48 N.W.2d
567 (1951); Zurn v. Whatley, 213 Wis. 365, 251 N.W. 435 (1933).
161. See Leflar, supra note 22, at 144-46.
162. See Married Women & Tortfeasors Act, 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. 5, ch. 30, § 6.
163. UNIF. ACT (1939), supra note 124.
164. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A comment j (1979).
165. Id. § 886A(3).
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come liable for conversion by reason of his bona fide purchase of stolen goods may be allowed contribution.
It is not enough for application of the rule. . . that the tortfeasor
seeking contribution has intentionally violated a statute, as by driving
at a speed in excess of the statutory limit or parking next to a fireplug, if his conduct is not intended to do harm to anyone.1 66
The Restatement drafters reason that contribution should be denied only when conscious and deliberate intent to do harm is an element of the underlying tort.167 In support of this approach, the drafters
argued that the rationale that courts should not aid a deliberate
wrongdoer only applies in cases in which the tortfeasor intended to
harm the victim.168 Likewise, the deterrence rationale for denying contribution applies only when the harm is intentional. 69 Some commentators would go further, however, and allow contribution when both
tortfeasors act deliberately. These commentators apparently reason
that when both tortfeasors are equally culpable, no reason exists to
deny contribution. 7 0 Additionally, the drafters argued that when the
actual harm exceeds the harm intended, a limited right of contribution
17
should be permitted. '
Regardless of the view taken toward intentional torts, however,
contribution should be allowed only when the judgment is granted for
the acts of multiple tortfeasors. Contribution clearly should not be7 2allowed for punitive damages intended for an individual tortfeasor.'
C.

Proceduresfor Enforcing Contribution

The Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act does not clearly delineate the procedures for enforcing the new substantive right to contribution. Unlike the 1939 Uniform Act, the 1955 version does not expressly
provide for impleading contribution defendants or for cross-claims
among defendants who are parties to the plaintiff's action on the underlying claim. The legislature further confused matters by adding two
sentences to the Act which are foreign both to the uniform acts and to
contribution legislation in other states. Thus, determining when a
claim for contribution may be brought remains a task for the courts in

166. Id. § 886A comment j.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
170. See Comment, supra note 71, at 231-32.
171. Id. at 232.
172. See, e.g., Pyramid Condominium Ass'n v. Morgan, 606 F. Supp. 592 (D. Md.
1985), af 'd, 823 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1987); Fox v. Mercer, 109 A.D.2d 59, 489 N.Y.S.2d 792

(1985).
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South Carolina.
The 1939 Act made extensive provisions for third-party practice,'"3

173. See UNIF. AcT (1939), supra note 124, § 7, at 58. Section 7 of the 1939 Uniform
Provided:
(1) Before answering, a defendant seeking contribution in a tort action
may move ex parte or, after answering, on notice to the plaintiff, for leave as a
third-party plaintiff to serve a summons and complaint upon a person not a
party to the action who is or may be liable as a joint tortfeasor to him or to the
plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him. If the motion is
granted and the summons and complaint are served, the person so served,
hereinafter called the third-party defendant, shall make his defense to the
complaint of the plaintiff and to the third-party complaint in the same manner
as defenses are made by an original defendant to an original complaint. The
third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiff's claim. The plaintiff shall amend his
pleadings to assert against the third-party defendant any claim which the
plaintiff might have asserted against the third-party defendant had he been
joined originally as a defendant. The third-party defendant is bound by the
adjudication of the third-party plaintiff's liability to the plaintiff as well as of
his own liability to the plaintiff and to the third-party plaintiff. A third-party
defendant may proceed under this Section against any person not a party to
the action who is or may be liable as a joint tortfeasor to him or to the thirdparty plaintiff for all or part of the claim made in the action against the thirdparty defendants.
(2) When a counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff he may cause a
third party to be brought in under circumstances which under this Section
would entitle a defendant to do so.
(3) A pleader may either (a) state as a cross-claim against a co-party any
claim that the co-party is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or part
of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant; or (b) move for
judgment for contribution against any other joint judgment debtor, where in a
single action a judgment has been entered against joint tortfeasors one of
whom has discharged the judgment by payment or has paid more than his pro
rata share thereof. If relief can be obtained as provided in this Subsection no
independent action shall be maintained to enforce the claim for contribution.
(4) The court may render such judgments, one or more in number, as may
be suitable under the provisions of this Act.
(5) As among joint tortfeasors against whom a judgment has been entered
in a single action, the provisions of Section 2, Subsection (4) or this Act apply
only if the issue of the proportionate fault is litigated between them by crosscomplaint in that action.
Id. This section of the Uniform Act is similar in concept and language to the third-party
practice provisions of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure (SCRCP) and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). See S.C.R. Civ. P. 14; FED. R. Civ. P. 14. One
notable difference between the 1939 Act and the federal and state rules is that under the
1939 Act the adjudication of the original defendant's liability to the original plaintiff is
binding upon the third-party defendant, while the SCRCP and FRCP provide that the
palintiff "may" amend his pleadings to assert a claim against the third-party defendant.
Cf. Larson Mach., Inc. v. Wallace, 268 Ark. 192, 600 S.W.2d 1 (1980) (noting that under
the 1939 Act the third-party plaintiff is automatically bound by judgment imposed on
the original defendant).
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but the Commissioners, deferring to the established procedures in the
states, deleted this provision from the 1955 Act.' 4 Of the states adopting the 1955 Act, only North Carolina has added an express provision
relating to third-party practice or cross-claims. 175 South Carolina has
not expressly provided for third-party practice in the Act, but instead
added to the enforcement provisions two sentences which question the
propriety of efforts to adjudicate contribution claims among defendants to the plaintiff's underlying action or efforts to add third-party
defendants not sued originally by the plaintiff.
South Carolina Code section 15-38-40 implements the Uniform
Act's enforcement procedures. The initial subsection provides, in a verbatim adoption of the uniform language, that a tortfeasor may bring a
separate contribution action against a co-tortfeasor. Under this provision, "[w]hether or not judgment has been entered in an action against
two or more tortfeasors for the same injury or wrongful death, contribution may be enforced by separate action. 178 This provision is consistent with practice in both state and federal court because procedural
rules of impleader and cross-claims are permissive rather than
mandatory and, therefore, do not preclude separate actions for
contribution. 7"

174. The Commissioners' comment to the 1955 Act states that "[n]o provision for
impleading and cross-complaints among joint tortfeasors in the original action prior to
trial on plaintiff's claims are included. This is left to the established procedure in the
several states." UNIF. AcT (1955), supra note 125, § 3 commissioners' comment to subsection (b), at 89.
175. The North Carolina Contribution Act provides:
If there is no judgment for the injury or wrongful death against the tort-feasor
seeking contribution, his right of contribution is barred unless he has either
(1) Discharged by payment the common liability within the statute of limitations period applicable to claimant's right of action against him and has commenced his action for contribution within one year after payment,
(2) Agreed while action is pending against him to discharge the common liability and has within one year after the agreement paid the liability and commenced his action for contribution, or
(3) While action is pending against him, joined the other tort-feasors as thirdparty defendants for the purpose of contribution.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-3(d) (1983). This provision is identical to the Uniform
Act and to South Carolina's version, except for the addition of subsection (3).
If the South Carolina courts allow third-party practice under the Act, the
North Carolina decisions addressing related issues should prove a helpful
resource.
176. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-33-40(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). "This simply announces the rather obvious proposition that the remedy of contribution may always be
enforced in a separate action and need not be enforced in the action establishing liability
for the tort, even where the case has gone to judgment." UNIP. AcT (1955), supra note
125, § 3 commissioners' comment to subsection (a), at 89.
177. Maloney Concrete Co. v. D.C. Transit Sys., Inc., 241 Md. 420, 216 A.2d 895 (Ct.
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Section 15-38-40(B), however, contains a curious departure from
the Uniform Act and versions of the Act implemented in other states.
Both section 15-38-40(B) and the Uniform Act begin with the following
sentence: "Where a judgment has been entered in an action against
two or more tortfeasors for the same injury or wrongful death, contribution may be enforced in that action by judgment in favor of one
against other judgment defendants by motion upon notice to all parties
to the action."'" 8 The South Carolina General Assembly, however,
added the following two sentences to subsection (B):
Provided, however, contribution may not be enforced in the action until the issue of liability and resulting damages against the defendant
or defendants named in the action is determined. Once the issue of
liability has been resolved, subject to Section 15-38-20(B), a defendant has the right to seek contribution against any judgment defendant
and other persons who were not made parties to the action. 179
The meaning of these two sentences is not self-evident. Nonetheless,
the construction given them will determine whether the Act is a workable means of equitably spreading the burden of liability or whether the
Act itself is so burdensome and expensive for defendants to apply that
those intended to benefit from it will be discouraged from using it.
The two sentences could be interpreted to limit contribution to
separate actions, eliminating impleader and cross-claim devices for determining rights among tortfeasors prior to a plaintiff's judgment
against one or more defendants. The sentences require determination
of liability and damages before contribution may be "enforced" or
before a defendant has "the right to seek" contribution. The legislature
probably added the sentences to the legislation at the insistence of
those who feared that the Act would allow defendants, through thirdparty practice, to raise significantly the level of complexity and expense for plaintiffs by adding defendants to the action. The doctrinal
justification for prohibiting a defendant from bringing claims against
other tortfeasors is that "there is no cause of action whatsoever [for
contribution] until a tortfeasor has paid more than his or her pro rata
share of a judgment. Therefore, there can be no cause of action until
'180
such time as that occurs."
The arguments against allowing cross-claims and third-party prac-

App. 1966).
178. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-40(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988); UNIF. ACT (1955),
supra note 125, § 3(a).
179. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-40(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
180. Smith, Third Party Practice and the Right of Contribution Among Joint
Tortfeasors: The Plaintiff's Perspective, in PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE UNDER THE SOUTH
CAROLINA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 118-19 (S.C. Bar JCLE 1988).
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tice under the Contribution Act, however, are not persuasive. These
devices do not increase significantly the plaintiff's burden or pose doctrinal inconsistencies. In fact, they greatly improve judicial economy.
First, using cross-claims or impleader under either the state or federal
rule does not increase the plaintiff's burden in litigation enough to justify proscription of their use. If a defendant is allowed to bring in additional parties alleged to be either solely or jointly liable for the plaintiff's damages, then the plaintiff must make new decisions based on the
presence of the new parties. The plaintiff must decide whether to assert claims against the third-party defendant and whether to adjust his
trial strategy based upon the defendant/third-party plaintiff's likely
defense that the damages were caused by the third-party defendant.
Several factors, however, mitigate the burdens associated with
these decisions. Initially, if a plaintiff's damages were arguably caused
at least in part by a third party, the defendant will likely contend that
the third party (not present in the suit) was an intervening cause of
the plaintiff's damages. In such a case the plaintiff will have a more
onerous task of countering the defendant's argument on this issue than
if the third party had been impleaded. The principal difference is that
a plaintiff's burden is increased in the absence of a third party because
demonstrating that the third party did not cause the damages becomes
solely the plantiff's responsibility. If the defendant were allowed under
Rule 14(a) to implead, then the third party could shoulder much, if not
all, of the responsibility for demonstrating that he did not intervene to
cause the plaintiff's damages.
Having a third party in court as an additional adversary to the
defendant can, therefore, actually alleviate the cost and complexity of
the plaintiff's case. The plaintiff, of course, can choose to assert claims
against the third-party defendant under the permissive provisions of
Rule 14(a).1 11 A plaintiff who chooses to such assert claims surely
would not protest inclusion of the additional defendant. Furthermore,
in some cases a plaintiff may not even be aware of the existence of a
third-party defendant prior to initiating the original action.
In addition to the practical considerations that mitigate the increased burden on plaintiffs, the rules of procedure also provide formal
means to prevent defendants from abusing third-party practice in con-

181. Rule 14(a) provides in part:
The plaintiff may assert any claim against the third-party defendant arising
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's
claim against the third-party plaintiff, and the third-party defendant thereupon shall assert his defenses as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims
and cross-claims as provided in Rule 13.
FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a); S.C.R. Civ. P. 14(a).
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tribution actions. In Nikolous v. Superior Court8

2

the Arizona Su-

preme Court considered a plaintiff's argument that "a plaintiff must
have the unfettered right to maintain a lawsuit as he or she sees fit,
without the confusion, complications, delays, costs and litigation burdens inherent in the proposed use of Rule 14(a)."'' 3 The court rejected
the plaintiff's argument and allowed impleader because the trial court
retains discretion under the rule to strike or sever the third-party
claim. 8 4 The Nikolous court stated:
We suggest that the trial court consider the nature of the evidence,
the merits and probable success of the proposed third-party action,
the need of the defendants and the benefit to the judicial system in
resolving liability and contribution issues in one action. Balanced
against this is the plaintiffs need to manage the risks of delay, of confusing the jury, and the additional procedural and financial burden to
the plaintiff if his narrow choice of defendants is expanded by a shotgun blast of contribution claims. The final decision must be a balance
of these and similar competing practical and equitable considerations.
Thus, the trial court's
rulings in this area necessarily require the exer8 5
cise of discretion.'
Both federal"8 s and state courts applying Rule 14(a) in the context of
South Carolina's Contribution Act would be authorized to use discretion similar to that suggested in Nikolous to alleviate any potential
unfairness to plaintiffs.
This same level of discretion also seems appropriate under other
rules relating to cross-claims and joinder of parties. For instance, under

182. 157 Ariz. 256, 756 P.2d 925 (1988) (en banc).
183. Id. at 259, 756 P.2d at 928.
184. Rule 14(a) provides in part that "[a]ny party may move to strike the thirdparty claim, or for its severance or separate trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a); S.C.R. Civ. P.
14(a). This motion may be made even if the party was added within ten days of the
answer without the necessity for leave of court. See H. LIGHTSEY & J. FLANAGAN, SOUTH
CAROLINA CivIL PROCEDURE 263 (1985). The purpose of the rule "is to protect the original
litigants from prejudiced [sic] cause [sic] by the joinder of parties and claims and the
harm may not appear until later in the litigation." Id. (citing 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1460 (1971)).
185. Nikolous, 157 Ariz. at 259, 756 P.2d at 928.
186. The official comment to the federal rule provides:
After the third-party defendant is brought in, the court has discretion to
strike the third-party claim if it is obviously unmeritorious and can only delay
or prejudice the disposition of the plaintiff's claim, or to sever the third-party
claim or accord it separate trial if confusion or prejudice would otherwise result. This discretion, applicable not merely to the cases covered by the amend-

ment where the third-party defendant is brought in without leave, but to all
impleaders under the rule, is emphasized in the next-to-last sentence of the
subdivision ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) advisory committee notes.
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Rule 13(g), which is identical under both state and federal procedure, a
defendant may state a claim
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein [,] ...[including] a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may
be liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the
action against the cross-claimant. 187
In addition to the judicial discretion permitted by Rule 13(g), Rule
13(i)
refers to Rule 42(b) Separate Trials, which gives the Court the power
to order separate trials on any cross or counterclaim or issue therein
in the interests of efficiency, convenience or to avoid prejudice to the
existing parties. This Rule also refers to Rule 54(b), Judgment Upon
Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties, and authorizes separate judgments in the severed actions.1 81
These rules provide an ample basis for a court to exercise the discretion necessary to prevent a plaintiff from becoming enmeshed in "a
18
web of litigation and cross-litigation spun by the defendant."3

Allowing defendants to litigate contribution claims, whether by
means of impleader, joinder or cross-claim, simultaneously with the
plaintiff's action against them also avoids creating an enigma for courts
charged with resolving rights that have not fully vested. Those opposing simultaneous consideration of a contribution claim with the main
cause of action insist that resolution of the contribution claim prior to
a defendant's payment of more than a pro rata share of a common
liability is premature and improper. Resolution of contingent or inchoate rights to contribution under these circumstances, however, is an
established practice in other states and expressly contemplated by
both the federal and state rules of procedure. Moreover, it is consistent
with contribution law.
Virtually all courts in other jurisdictions that have adopted the
1955 Uniform Act have found that their rules of procedure permit litigation of contribution claims in the plaintiff's action, even if asserted
prior to payment of a judgment. 10 In Florida, for instance, the contri-

187. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g); S.C.R. Civ. P. 13(g). Interestingly, the principal commentators on the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure note that cross-claims for contribution are permitted and that such claims may be contingent. See H. LIGHTSEY & J. FLANAGAN, supra note 184, at 255. This comment, however, was written prior to the adoption of
the Contribution Act and does not relate to the specific language of the Act addressing
cross-claims and third-party practice.
188. H. LIGHTSEY & J. FLANAGAN, supra note 184, at 257.
189. Nikolous, 157 Ariz. at 259, 756 P.2d at 928.
190. See, e.g., Thornton v. Town of Hull, 515 F. Supp. 715 (D. Mass. 1981); Niko-
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bution act also provides that "[w]hen a judgment has been entered in
an action against two or more tortfeasors.
contribution may be enforced in that action by judgment in favor of one against other judgment defendants ....

."I"' Florida's

state rules of procedure also in-

clude a provision identical to the Federal and South Carolina text of
Rule 14(a). 192 In New Hampshire Insurance Ca. v. Petrik 93 the Florida district court of appeal for the first district noted that the contribution statute allows a separate action for contribution but "does not
state that contribution must be enforced by separate action."' 9 ' Accordingly, the court held that the defendant in that action could bring
a third-party action against an alleged joint tortfeasor. The court
observed:
Since the establishment of procedure is peculiarly a judicial function
and because of the implicit logic that the same jury which assesses
recovery for the plaintiff should also assess against whom such recovery is made, the third party action for contribution against a party not
made a defendant by the plaintiff is not prohibited as a matter of law
as found by the trial court. 195
Allowing a defendant to use impleader, joinder and cross-claims to
assert contribution claims in a plaintiff's action is a more sensible approach because it maximizes judicial economy and efficiency. In Markey v. Skog,'96 an opinion often cited as a basis for allowing third-party
practice to assert contribution claims, the Superior Court of New
Jersey set forth the judicial economy rationale:
The ascertion [sic] by codefendants in a negligence action of a right of
contribution inter sese and the right of a defendant to implead a joint
tortfeasor by a third-party complaint before plaintiff's cause of action
has been reduced to a judgment are merely devices of procedural convenience afforded by the rules of practice. Thus, although a defendant
is not necessarily bound to proceed against joint tortfeasors in the

lous v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 256, 756 P.2d 925 (1988) (en banc); National Farmers
Union Property & Casualty Co. v. Frackelton, 662 P.2d 1056 (Colo. 1983); Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fouts, 323 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1985); Phillips v. Heffner, 11 Ohio Misc. 2d
25, 464 N.E.2d 195 (1983).
191. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.31(4)(b) (West 1989). The Florida statute does not contain the additional language bound after the quoted sentence in the South Carolina
statute.
192. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.180.
193. 343 So. 2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
194. Id. at 49.
195. Id. at 50; see also Christiani v. Popovich, 363 So. 2d 2, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (cross-claims also permitted to litigate contribution issues in plaintiff's lawsuit),
cert. denied, 389 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 1980).
196. 129 N.J. Super. 192, 322 A.2d 513 (1974).
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same action in which plaintiff seeks to establish his (defendant's) liability, he ordinarily will, nevertheless, do so because a single action is
the most orderly and logical manner in which proof of common liability can be established-and it is, of course, common
liability which is
1 17
the substantive basis of the right of contribution.
The Arizona Supreme Court in Nikolous v. Superior Court 9 8 used

a similar analysis in holding that contribution claims fall within the
purview of Rule 14(a). The plaintiff in Nikolous contended that, "be-

cause the cause of action for contribution does not really exist before a
tortfeasor pays more than its prorata [sic] share, and defendants have
not yet paid any share, defendants have no contribution rights to assert in a third-party action."19 The court was not persuaded, stating:
The fact that the right of contribution might not exist or become enforceable by direct action until payment of more than the pro rata
share of liability does not conflict with the language or intent of Rule
14(a) ....
...Rule 14(a) was designed to promote the interests of judicial
economy and efficiency by permitting the procedural assertion of just
such contingent or inchoate claims. It is precisely this type of consolidated proceeding which is "the most orderly and logical method" to
establish the common0 liability which is the substantive basis of the
2
right of contribution.

Without question, Rule 14(a) is a proper vehicle for litigating contribution claims. In Lightner v. Duke Power Co.,201 the first decision to
construe the South Carolina Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, a
federal district court defined the nature of a contribution right prior to
entry or payment of judgment. The court stated:
[A] right to contribution, and hence a cause of action for contribution,

197. Id. at 200, 322 A.2d at 517 (citation omitted).
198. 157 Ariz. 256, 756 P.2d 925 (1988) (en banc).
199. Id. at 257, 756 P.2d at 926.
200. Id. at 258, 756 P.2d at 927 (quoting Markey v. Skog, 129 N.J. Super. 192, 200,
322 A.2d 513, 517 (1974)); accord Thornton v. Town of Hull, 515 F. Supp. 715 (D.Mass.
1981) (although third-party plaintiff's right to recover does not accrue until after judgment is entered, plaintiff may bring d third-party complaint before any judgment is entered); National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co. v. Frackelton, 662 P.2d 1056,
1063 (Colo. 1983) ("[A] person 'liable in tort,' but not a party to the original suit may
still be liable for contribution [because the term 'liable in tort'] . . .refers to a person's
exposure to a civil action and not to the existence of final judgment in tort." (footnote
omitted)); Phillips v. Heffner, 11 Ohio Misc. 2d 25, 464 N.E.2d 195 (1983) (tortfeasor
allowed to implead concurrent tortfeasor because impleaded tortfeasor may be liable
over the defendant tortfeasor for share of plaintiff's recovery.)
201. 719 F. Supp. 1310 (D.S.C. 1989).
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arises when the underlying tort giving rise to a common liability occurs. This inchoate .right matures into a complete and enforceable
right of action only after a tortfeasor pays more than his pro rata
share of the judgment. . . . Thus, the inchoate right accrues when the
common liability arises, but the remedy is not available until a
tortfeasor pays more than his share of the judgment." 2
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that
Rule 14 was created to facilitate the trial of inchoate claims. In Glen
20 3
Falls Indemnity Co. v. Atlantic Building Corp. the Fourth Circuit
addressed the propriety of asserting similar actions under Rule 14. The
court held:
Rule 14 was designed to . . . enable the rights of an indemnitee
against an indemnitor and the rights of the latter against a wrongdoer
to be finally settled in one and the same suit. It is generally held that
it is no obstacle to a third party action that the liability, if any, of the
third party defendant can be established only after that of the original defendant and after the satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim, where
204
subrogation is the basis of the claim.
The court explained the rationale for its liberal construction of
20 5
stating:
Rule 14(a) in American Export Lines v. Revel,
The purpose of third-party procedure is to prevent circuity of action
by drawing into one proceeding all parties who may become ultimately liable, so that they may therein assert and have a determination of their various claims inter sese. This is intended to save time
and cost of duplicating evidence and to obtain consistent results from
identical or similar evidence, as well as to avoid the serious handicap
and a
of a time lag between a judgment against the original defendant
20 6
judgment in his favor against the third-party defendant.
Rule 14(a) has proved an effective device for asserting contribution claims in other jurisdictions, even when multiple parties are alleged to be liable to the plaintiff on various theories. In Pitcavage v.
Mastercraft Boat Co. 20 7 a Pennsylvania district court allowed a defend-

202. Id. at 1316.
203. 199 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1952).
204. Id. at 63. As noted earlier, the South Carolina version of Rule 14(A) is identical
to the federal rule. Although no South Carolina decisions have interpreted the scope of
Rule 14, commentators have observed that the rule reverses prior holdings that causes of
action cannot be maintained until they accrue. See H. LIGHTSEY & J. FLANAGAN, supra
note 184, at 259 (citing Smart v. Charleston Mobile Homes, Inc., 269 S.C. 588, 239 S.E.2d
78 (1977), as a decision no longer effective after adoption of Rule 14 in South Carolina).
205. 262 F.2d 122 (4th Cir. 1958), aftd, 266 F.2d 82 (4th Cir. 1989).
206. Id. at 124-25.
207. 632 F. Supp. 842 (M.D. Pa. 1985).
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ant in a products liability action to assert a third-party action against
users of the product to establish that the users' negligence made them
jointly and severally liable with the manufacturer of the product. 0 8
The court noted:
In the present case, the third-party defendants may be liable to Mastercraft for contribution if it is later determined that the third-party
defendants "contributed" to the accident. It is not necessary that the
third-party defendants be automatically liable for all or part of plaintiffs' claim. Impleader is proper if under some construction of facts
which might be adduced at trial, recovery by the third-party plaintiff
would be possible.2""
Pitcavage also demonstrates how a court may deal with a plaintiff's contention that impleader confuses the issues at trial. In Pitcavage the plaintiffs opposed the impleader, arguing that permitting it
would prejudice their case against the original defendants. The court
rejected this argument, however, stating:
Plaintiffs contend that they should be able to proceed with their case
without having a legal issue, which should not be considered by the
jury, becoming a potential obstacle to recovery.. . . The issue of the
third-party defendants' negligence may bear on the causation question in plaintiffs' case, and, in any event, can be effectively separated
from the legal issues in the main case by use of proper jury instructions. Plaintiffs' interpretation of Rule 14 would require separate suits
anytime different legal standards apply to the main case and the
third-party suit. "Rule 14 should be liberally construed to effectuate
its intended purpose of accomplishing in one proceeding the adjudication of the rights of all persons concerned in the controversy and to
prevent the
necessity of trying several related claims in different
lawsuits." 21
Because much of the same testimony and evidence would have been
required to resolve the various claims, the court allowed use of

impleader.
Allowing contribution claims to be litigated simultaneously with
the plaintiff's action is also consistent with the underlying purpose for
allowing contribution in South Carolina. Prior to adoption of the Contribution Act in South Carolina, plaintiffs could choose their defendants.2 11 The Uniform Act is designed in part to limit the plaintiff's

208. For further discussion of this decision and of problems associated with contribution among tortfeasors liable under different theories, see infra notes 250-77 and accompanying text.
209. Pitcavage, 632 F. Supp. at 847-48.
210. Id. at 848 (citations and footnotes omitted).
211. See Hills v. Price, 79 F. Supp. 494 (E.D.S.C. 1948).
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choice.2 12 Interpretations of the Act which displace this objective inevitably undermine full implementation of the Act's equitable goals.21 In
weighing the plaintiff's concerns that occasional defendants will abuse
the privilege afforded under both the Act and rules of procedure, the
interests of judicial economy and fairness tilt the scales decisively
against a broad proscription of litigating contribution claims along
with the plaintiff's claims.
Section 15-38-40(B) 214 of South Carolina's Contribution Act
should be viewed against the backdrop of decisions in other states implementing language borrowed from the Uniform Act. As previously
noted, those states almost unanimously allow third-party practice
under the Act.215 Accordingly, the first sentence added by the South
Carolina legislature to the uniform language should be interpreted
merely to mean that the right of contribution is inchoate until liability
and damages are determined and one tortfeasor pays more than his pro
rata share. The last sentence should be construed as nothing more than
a restatement of section 15-38-40(A), with the added reference to the
possibility of seeking contribution from nonparties to the original
2 16
action.
D. PartiesEntitled to Contribution
Regardless of the procedure used to assert an alleged right of contribution, contribution claimants must establish the requisite relationship between themselves and the alleged joint tortfeasor. The Act provides that "where two or more persons become jointly or severally
liable in tort for the same injury to person or property or for the same
wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them .... ,217
The Act also refers in three places to the "common liability" among
the tortfeasors. 218 The 1955 Act is different from the 1939 Act which
used and defined "joint tortfeasors" in referring to the parties among

212. See UNIF. AcT (1955), supra note 125, commissioners' preforatory note, at 59.
213. For a full discussion of the plaintiff's choice rule in the context of statutes of
limitations issues under the Act, see infra notes 313-15 and accompanying text.
214. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-40(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
215. See cases-cited in supra note 190.

216. See H. LIGHTSEY & J. FLANAGAN, supra note 184, at 259.
217. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-20(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). This language is taken
directly from the 1955 Uniform Act. See UNIF. AcT (1955), supra note 125, § 1(a), at 63.
"By posing joint and several liability as alternatives. . . the statute apparently does not
require joint action by tortfeasors as long as there is a common injury that gives rise to
at least several liability." Coffey, ContributionAmong Joint Tortfeasors:A Florida Case
Law Survey and Analysis, 35 UNIV. MIAMI L. REv. 971, 975 (1981).
218. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-38-20(E), -40(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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whom a right of contribution exists. 19 The Commissioners changed the
language used in this section of the Act, however, to accommodate
those states in which "joint tortfeasors" has a special procedural meaning, and the change does not seem to signal a difference in the nature
of common liability required to bring parties within the Act. s0 Thus,
those interpreting this section of the Act should not be deterred from
looking to those states that have adopted the 1939 Act rather than the
1955 Act.
The starting point for determining the class of tortfeasors who
share a right of contribution is the law of South Carolina concerning
joint and several liability prior to enactment of the Contribution Act.
This section of the Article will set forth the principles of joint and several liability as established under the common law of South Carolina.
In addition, this section will explore several issues regarding the limits
of joint and several liability that have arisen in other jurisdictions in
which a right of contribution has been recognized.
1. Joint and Several Liability in South Carolina
South Carolina has long recognized the concept of joint and several liability, and from the earliest decisions applying the concept the
courts have focused on the indivisibility of injury caused by more than
one tortfeasor, rather than the unity or concert of the tortfeasors' conduct. In Matthews v. SeaboardAir Line Railway22 the South Carolina
Supreme Court considered the nature of liability of three railroad company defendants in an action for wrongful death. The plaintiff alleged
that the defendants' joint negligence led to the decedent's death from
injuries he suffered when he fell into an excavation created to allow the
three defendant companies' tracks to intersect and bypass each other.
Accepting this argument, the court held that the defendants each had
a duty to place some protective measures around the excavation. The

219. The 1939 Act provides that "the term 'joint tortfeasors' means two or more
persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property ....

UNIF. AcT (1939), supra note 124, § 1, at 57.
220. UNIF. AcT (1955), supra note 125, § 1 commissioners' comment to subsection
(a), at 63. The commissioners' comment to the 1955 Act states:
This combines the provisions of Sections 1 and 2 of the 1939 Act. The
definition of "joint tortfeasors" and the term itself have been eliminated.
There are still a few jurisdictions in which those who act independently and
not in concert, as for example two colliding automobile drivers, cannot always
be joined as defendants in the same action. In these jurisdictions the tendency
is to use "joint tortfeasors" to refer only to those who can be joined. The term
is not indispensable to the Act, and the change in meaning might perhaps be
confusing in those states.

221. 67 S.C. 499,'46 S.E. 335 (1903).
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court defined joint and several liability as follows:
"If two or more persons owe to another the same duty, and by their
common neglect of that duty, he is injured, doubtless, the tort is joint,
and upon well settled principles each, any, or all of the tortfeasors
may be held. But when each of two or more persons owe to another a
separate duty, which each wrongfully neglects to perform, then, although the duties were diverse and disconnected, and the neglect of
each was without concert, if such several neglects concurred and
united together in causing injury, the tort is equally joint, and the
'
tortfeasors are subject to a like liability."222

Similarly, in Pendelton v. Columbia Railway, Gas & Electric
Co.223 the supreme court considered a plaintiffs claim for personal injuries brought against a railroad company and an automobile driver.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant railway company negligently
discharged him from one of its cars in the middle of the street and the
defendant driver subsequently struck him with his automobile. The
court defined joint and several liability in much the same terms as the
Matthews court, stating:
That a single injury, which is the proximate result of the separate and
independent acts of negligence of two or more parties, subjects the
tort-feasors, even in the absence of community of design or concert of

action, to a liability which is both joint and several, is a proposition
recognized and approved in this state and supported by the great
weight of authority elsewhere. 4

The court further held that a plaintiff proceeding against more than
one defendant still had only one cause of action that could be asserted
either jointly against the defendants in a single action or separately in
different actions, even if a defendant had breached more than one duty
22
owed to the plaintiff.

222. Id. at 514-15, 46 S.E. at 340 (quoting Matthews v. R.R. Co., 22 L.R.A. 262 (N.J.
1893)).
223. 133 S.C. 326, 131 S.E. 265 (1926).
224. Id. at 331, 131 S.E. at 267.
225. See id. at 331-34, 131 S.E. at 267-68. The primary issue in Pendelton was
whether the plaintiff in a suit against multiple defendants could be forced to declare
whether his claims were against the defendants jointly or separately. The court held that
the plaintiff could not sue the defendants severally in a single action. Id. at 335; 131 S.C.
at 268. If the plaintiff joined two defendants in a single action, then tile plaintiff's cause
of action necessarily was against the defendants "jointly." The court observed:
Neither the fact that the complaint in the case at bar sets out in separate
paragraphs the separate acts of negligence of each defendant which are alleged
to have caused the single injury complained of, nor the fact that the negligent
acts are alleged to have been committed by two separate and independent parties, make of the complaint one which states more than one cause of action in
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The South Carolina Supreme Court re-emphasized the nature of
the injury and rejected a focus on the source of the duties breached in
Meddin v.Southern Railway.226 In Meddin a purchaser of perishable
goods sued the shipper of the goods and the railway carrier as joint
tortfeasors for failing to ship the goods in sufficient ice to prevent
spoilage. The plaintiff alleged that the two defendants breached a variety of duties, including various Public Service Commission regulations
applicable to shippers and common carriers. The carrier sought a demurrer to the complaint against it on the grounds that "no joint cause
of action in tort [was] stated in the complaint, but that several causes
of action not arising out of the same transactions [had] been improperly united.

'22 7

The court held:

[W]here the negligence of a shipper in its violation of the tariff rules
and regulations combines and concurs, as a proximate cause of the
injury sustained by the owner, with the negligence of a common carrier in the performance of its legal duties relating to the protection
and preservation of a carload of perishable food products, each of
them is liable in tort,
and they may be joined in a suit against them as
2
joint tort-feasors. 1
Thus, the South Carolina definition of joint and several liability
pre-dating enactment of the contribution statute is consistent with the
statute's pronouncement that a contribution claimant must be liable
for the "same injury" or the "same wrongful death."2 2 9 Accordingly,
since courts determine who is a joint tortfeasor within the Act based
upon the nature of the injury rather than on the degree of concert
among the tortfeasors, the similarity of duties owed the plaintiff by the
tortfeasors, or the time lapse between the tortious conduct of the

the sense with which we are here concerned with the meaning of that term.
The plaintiff expressly alleges that the separate acts of negligence attributed to
each of the defendants concurred and cooperated to produce the result-the
injury complained of. Having elected to sue the two defendants in one action,
and having alleged that the acts of each concurred in causing his injury-the
only theory upon which he was entitled to sue both in one action-he must
recover, if at all, upon the theory of joint liability, and not that of separate
causes of action predicated upon the several liability of the two defendants.
Id. at 334-35, 131 S.E. at 268; accord Halsey v. Minnesota-South Carolina Land & Timber Co., 174 S.C. 97, 177 S.E. 29 (1934); Martin v. Hines, 150 S.C. 210, 147 S.E. 870
(1929); McKenzie v. Southern Ry., 113 S.C. 453, 102 S.E. 514 (1920); cf. Christiansen v.
Campbell, 285 S.C. 164, 166, 328 S.E.2d 351, 353 (Ct. App. 1985)("[O]ne injured by the
wrongful act of two or more joint tort-feasors may elect either to sue each tort-feasor
separately or to join them as parties defendant in a single action.").
226. 218 S.C. 155, 62 S.E.2d 109 (1950).
227. Id. at 166, 62 S.E.2d at 113.
228. Id. at 167, 62 S.E.2d at 113.
229. See S.C. CODV ANN. § 15-38-20(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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tortfeasors, the task of interpreting the scope of the statute becomes
simpler for the courts and more predictable for litigants.2"'
2. Problems with Successive Tortfeasors
Identifying and analyzing the potential obstacles that could upset
the determination of which tortfeasors become jointly and severally liable for the same injury is an imposing task, even if the focus remains
upon the singularity of the injury rather than upon the nature of the
actors' conduct. Difficulties are likely to emerge, for example, when an
initial tortfeasor causes an injury and a subsequent tortfeasor aggravates that injury. Even before adoption of contribution, South Carolina
recognized the majority rule that "the intervening negligence of a third

230. In several Florida decisions, the appellate courts have engrafted upon their
contribution statute, which contains the same language as the South Carolina and Uniform Acts regarding joint and several liability, requirements not contained in the statute.
In Leesburg Hosp. Ass'n v. Carter, 321 So. 2d 433 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), the plaintiff
sued a hospital for malpractice and the hospital filed a third-party claim against the
treating physician. The court allowed the contribution claim to proceed, but observed in
dicta that the defendants' conduct must have occurred within a certain time period, even
though the court did not require "split-second timing." Id. at 435. In VTN Consol. Inc.
v. Coastal Eng'g Assocs., 341 So. 2d 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 345 So.
2d 428 (Fla. 1977), the court applied the time requirement to preclude a contribution
claim. The plaintiff developer sued a surveyor who had prepared maps on a project and
the surveyor sought to implead the engineers who had used the maps.
The court examined the relationship between the conduct of the surveyor and
the engineers, not the commonality of injury caused by their separate acts. The
court stated that "the claim for contribution must be related to the original
cause of action-it must arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions." Apparently focusing on the fact that the topographical maps were prepared two years before the engineers allegedly misused them, the court held
that they were not part of the same series of transactions. The Second District
thus appears to have engrafted a transactional, or time-proximity, test upon a
statutory standard that ostensibly could have been met by merely showing the
"same injury."
Coffey, supra note 217, at 976 (footnotes omitted) (quoting VTN Consol, Inc., 341 So.2d
at 228-29).
A Florida district court of appeal in Touche Ross & Co. v. Sun Bank, 366 So. 2d 465
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 378 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1979), refused to allow an accounting firm sued for not detecting an embezzlement from asserting a contribution claim
against a bank for wrongfully honoring embezzlement checks. The court held that the
accounting firm and the bank were not "exposed to [the plaintiff hospital] under the
same set of circumstances." Id. at 467. Under these decisions, the Florida statute apparently requires not only that two tortfeasors cause the "same injury," but also that they
act within a reasonably related time frame. Attaching such requirements as prerequisites
to finding persons jointly and severally liable under a contribution act does not make
sense. For a more complete discussion of these and other decisions interpreting this section of the Florida Contribution Act, see Coffey, supra note 217.
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person will not excuse the original wrongdoer if such intervention
ought to have been foreseen in the exercise of due care. '2 31 Thus, if a
tortfeasor causes an injury which subsequently is aggravated by a physician, the tortfeasor remains liable for the original injury and for the
aggravation 2 despite the physician's intervention in the chain of
causation.

23

The pertinent question, of course, is not whether the initial
tortfeasor is liable for all of the damages to the plaintiff on proximate
cause grounds, but whether the physician is liable for contribution to
the initial tortfeasor. Although judicial decisions analyze the issue differently, the results are notably consistent. As a general rule, an initial
tortfeasor cannot obtain contribution from a subsequently negligent
treating physician.2 33 While the reasons for this rule vary from case to

231. Graham v. Whitaker, 282 S.C. 393, 399, 321 S.E.2d 40, 44 (1984).
232. Id. In Graham an opthamologist put eye drops into the eyes of a patient without warning the patient that blurriness would result. The patient fell and injured her
hip. When a surgeon placed a pin in her hip it became infected. The court held the
opthamologist liable for the entire damages, including those resulting from the infected
hip. The court noted:
It has been held in South Carolina that the negligence of an attending physician is reasonably foreseeable. The general rule is that if an injured person uses
ordinary care in selecting a physician for treatment of his injury, the law regards the aggravation of the injury resulting from the negligent act of the physician as part of the immediate and direct damages which naturally flow from
the original injury.

Id.
233. See, e.g., Reese v. AMF-Whitely, 420 F. Supp. 985, 989 (D. Neb. 1976) (Defendant manufacturer could not obtain contribution from physician because negligent medical care is foreseeable risk; however, "[tihe doctrine of subrogation has been applied in
successive tortfeasor cases when the original wrongdoer has paid damages attributable
not only to his own wrong but to the subsequent aggravation of injuries by the successive
tortfeasor."); Albertson's, Inc. v. Adams, 473 So. 2d 231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (pharmacists who gave incorrect prescription to patient could not obtain contribution from
physician who failed to detect symptoms of incorrect medication because physician was
at most a subsequent tortfeasor); Rudeck v. Wright, 218 Mont. 41, 709 P.2d 621 (1985)
(surgeon who left sponge in patient not allowed to seek contribution from radiologist
who failed to notice sponge in x-rays); Bost v. Metcalfe, 219 N.C. 607, 14 S.E.2d 648
(1941) (active tortfeasor who caused original injury cannot obtain contribution from
merely passive tortfeasor doctor who negligently treated injuries); Fisher v. Milwaukee
Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 173 Wis. 57, 180 N.W. 269 (1920) (railroad company not allowed
contribution from doctor who aggravated injury caused to plaintiff by railroad; railroad
was, however, subrogated to plaintiff's cause of action against doctor). See generally Annotation, Right of Tortfeasor Initially CausingInjury to Recover Indemnity or Contribution From Medical Attendant Causing New Injury or Aggravating Injury in Course
of Treatment, 8 A.L.R.3d 639 (1966 & Supp. 1989) (original tortfeasor and physician
who causes subsequent injury generally are not considered joint tortfeasors and physician will not be liable under theory of contribution).
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2 34
case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Harka v. Nabati
set forth
the typical analysis supporting the conclusion that a negligent doctor is
not jointly and severally liable with an initial tortfeasor. The court
stated:

"The acts of the original wrongdoer and the negligent physician are
severable as to time, neither having the opportunity to guard against
the other's acts, and each breaching a different duty owed to the injured plaintiff. While they are two active tortfeasors they are not acting 'jointly' when using that term in the strict sense."2 35
Pennsylvania, however, uses a very strict definition of joint and several
liability. Of the numerous factors a court could consider in determining
if tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable, the Harka court used
them all. Prosser and Keeton list the panoply of tests proposed for
determining whether tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable as the
following:
[T]he identity of a cause of action against each of two or more defendants; the existence of a common, or like, duty; whether the same evidence will support an action against each; the single, indivisible nature of the injury to the plaintiffs; identity of the facts as to time,
place or result; whether the injury is direct and immediate, rather
than consequential; responsibility of the defendants for the same in23
juria,as distinguished from the same damnum. 6
The court in Harka listed these factors to consider in making a determination of joint and several liability.2 37 This approach is narrow, unpredictable, and inevitably leads into the quagmire of case-by-case
analysis.
The factors used in Harka, and to a greater or lesser degree in
other states, should not be used to determine who will receive and who
will make contribution. First, the identity of the cause of action against
the two tortfeasors, the overlap of evidence necessary to prove the liability of the defendants, and the identity of facts as to time, place or
result are all factors more properly considered in determining the best
procedure for hearing a contribution claim, not in determining if a substantive right exists between the parties. 238 For instance, a plaintiff's

234. 337 Pa. Super. 617, 487 A.2d 432 (1985).
235. Id. at 622, 487 A.2d at 434 (quoting Lasprogata v. Qualls, 263 Pa. Super. 174,
179, 397 A.2d 803, 805 (1979)).
236. PROSSER & KEErON, supra note 2, at 322 n.2. Interestingly, Prosser and Keeton
list these factors in the context of demonstrating the confusing variety of tests that various states use in deciding when parties are jointly and severally liable.
237. 337 Pa. Super. at 662, 487 A.2d at 434.
238. For a full discussion of procedural aspects of adjudicating contribution claims,
see supra notes 173-216 and accompanying text.
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cause of action 239 against a negligent automobile driver is distinct from
his cause of action against a doctor whose malpractice aggravated the
injury. Proof of the plaintiff's claim against the driver of a second automobile who the plaintiff claims caused the initial injury will not require proof of the same facts or application of the same law as proof of
a claim against the doctor. If, for this reason, the possibility exists that
the plaintiff's case against the second driver will be prejudiced by the
second driver's presentation of evidence regarding the doctor's malpractice, then the plaintiff would move for separate trials pursuant to
either the federal or state rules.2 40 These procedural considerations can
be accommodated under modern civil practice and do not justify rejecting the contribution claimant's substantive right to contribution.
The severability of the tortfeasors' conduct in terms of time is also
not a valid consideration in determining if the parties have contribution rights. If their conduct was separated by such a period of time
that it creates confusion in presentation of the issues to a single jury,
the problem is purely procedural and can be addressed as suggested
above under the rules of civil procedure. If the lapse in time between
the conduct of the tortfeasors poses a problem in preservation of evidence, then the party prejudiced should seek relief under a statute of
limitations or laches, rather than under the law of joint and several
liability. The policy considerations underlying the prejudice flowing
from a party's delay in bringing an action share no identity with the
policies behind establishing joint and several liability under the Contribution Act. Furthermore, confusing the two only flusters the pursuit of
equity under the Act.
The remaining considerations set forth by Prosser and Keeton and

239. A South Carolina federal district court decision interpreting the Contribution
Act recently discussed the nature of a cause of action, stating:
A "cause of action" in South Carolina is defined as "'a legal wrong threatened
or committed against the complaining party.'" State v. Piedmont & N. Ry.,
186 S.C. 49, 194 S.E. 631, 633 (1938) (citation omitted). It is composed of three
parts-" 'a right in the plaintiff, a correlative duty or obligation resting on the
defendant, and some act or omission done by the latter in violation of the
right.'" Skalowski v. Joe Fisher,Inc., 152 S.C. 108, 149 S.E. 340, 344 (1929)
(citation omitted). The court in Skalowski further stated that "'[t]he cause of
action is the right claimed or wrong suffered by the plaintiff on the one hand,
and the duty or delict of the defendant on the other, and these appear by the
facts of each separate case.'" Id. (citation omitted).
Lightner v. Duke Power Co., 719 F. Supp. 1310, 1316 (D.S.C. 1989).
240. If the second driver impleaded the doctor, then the plaintiff would move to
strike the defendant's claim against the doctor or to sever the claim against the doctor
pursuant to Rule 14(a). See FED.R. Civ. P. 14(a); S.C.R. Civ. P. 14(a). Other applicable
federal and state rules are Rule 42(b) (separate trials) and Rule 54(b) (judgment upon
multiple claims or involving multiple parties).
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applied in Harka concern the indivisibility of the injury to the plaintiff-the only criterion for joint and several liability mentioned in the
Uniform Act, the basic test of joint and several liability preceding the
Act in South Carolina, and the only concern unique to the analysis of
whether the tortfeasors should share the burden of liability for the
wrong. When more than one tortfeasor is alleged to be responsible for
an injury, the following three possibilities exist for assigning liability:
(1) One tortfeasor is only technically liable for the other's wrong and
should therefore receive indemnification for any liability attributed to
him;241 or (2) the two tortfeasors caused separate, apportionable injures
to the plaintiff and should be separately liable; or (3) the two
tortfeasors proximately caused the same injury and should each have a
right of contribution from the other.
Of these three possibilities, apportionment is the most difficult to
apply. Apportionment is a doctrine consistent with both indemnity and
contribution and available to fill the gaps between the two. When contribution is inappropriate because two or more tortfeasors are not
jointly liable for an injury that is indivisible and indemnity is unavailable because neither of the tortfeasors is without fault, then the court
should be allowed to assess against the defendants the portion of dam2 42
ages caused by each.
Apportionment is not entirely foreign to South Carolina. In Rourk
v. Selvey 243 the South Carolina Supreme Court considered whether apportionment was appropriate in an automobile collision case in which
the parties were jointly and severally liable. The court stated that "for
many years the bench and bar of this state have assumed that apportionment of damages among joint tort feasors, according to the jury's

241. For a more complete discussion of the principles of indemnification in South
Carolina, see supra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
242. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 52, at 345. Prosser and Keeton offer
the following justification:
Where a factual basis can be found for some rough practical apportionment,
which limits a defendant's liability to that part of the harm of which that defendant's conduct has been a cause in fact, it is likely that the apportionment
will be made. Where no such basis can be found, the courts generally hold the
defendant for the entire loss, notwithstanding the fact that other causes have
contributed to it.
The distinction is one between injuries which are reasonably capable of
being separated and injuries which are not. . . .There will be obvious difficulties of proof as to the apportionment of certain elements of damages, such as
physical and mental suffering and medical expenses, but such difficulties are
not insuperable, and it is better to attempt some rough division than to hold
one defendant for the wound inflicted by the other.
243. 252 S.C. 25, 164 S.E.2d 909 (1968).
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view of the degree of their culpability, is allowable under our law.1244
The court correctly ruled that apportionment was not proper in Rourk
because the injury was caused by a "single impact" 245 and the damages
were "indivisible.

' 28

Distinguishing Bevin v. Linguard,24

7

a decision in

which apportionment was permitted, the Rourk court stated:
The action [in Bevin] was for beating the plaintiff in his dwelling
house and for damage to the dwelling and furnishings. Plaintiff's injuries did not, as here, flow from a single impact. It does not appear that
some rough approximation of the damage done by each defendant
was, as here, impossible. The allowance of apportionment is not unusual where such an approximation may reasonably be made.""
On the basis of this language, it is arguable that apportionment of di-

244. Id. at 29, 164 S.E.2d at 910. Actually, the court misstated the problem. "Culpability" is not an issue in apportionment because it is a question of fault. Apportionment
concerns the divisibility of injury, not the degree of fault.
245. Id. at 34, 164 S.E.2d at 913.
246. Id. at 35, 164 S.E.2d at 914. The basis for the ruling in Rourke is disputable,
but the basis for the holding asserted here is, at least, a fair reading of the case. In South
Carolina Ins. Co. v. James C. Greene & Co., 290 S.C. 171, 348 S.E.2d 617 (Ct. App. 1986),
the South Carolina Court of Appeals interpreted Rourk to mean that "the courts will not
undertake to apportion damages among the various persons whose negligence concurred
to cause the plaintiff's injury." Id. at 176, 348 S.E.2d at 620. This sentence does not
clearly support the view of Rourk asserted here, nor does it contradict it. The court in
South Carolina Ins. could have meant that apportionment is not available to joint
tortfeasors responsible for an indivisible injury, which is consistent with this Article's
view, or, conversely, it could have meant that apportionment is not available under any
circumstance.
247. 3 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 503 (1805).
248. Rourk, 252 S.C. at 34, 164 S.E.2d at 913 (citing PROSSER ON TORTs, § 42 (3d ed.
1964)). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has used similar language in applying federal common law to claims made pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. V 1987).
The court in United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989), observed:
Under common law rules, when two or more persons act independently to
cause a single harm for which there is a reasonable basis of apportionment
according to the contribution of each, each is held liable only for the portion of
harm that he causes. When such persons cause a single and indivisible harm,
however, they are held liable jointly and severally for the entire harm.
Id. at 172 (citations omitted). The Monsanto court adopted the apportionment rule of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides:
(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes where
(a) there are distinct harms, or
(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each
cause to a single harm.
(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned among two or more
causes.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs

§ 433A (1965).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol41/iss3/4

40

Brunson: Contribution in South Carolina--Venturing into Uncharted Waters
1990]

CONTRIBUTION IN SOUTH CAROLINA

visible damages among several tortfeasors should be made when the
tortfeasors are barred from seeking indemnity or contribution.249
3. Problems Created When Defendants Are Liable Under Different
Theories
Several jurisdictions that have adopted a version of the Uniform
Act have considered whether a tortfeasor liable to a plaintiff for negligence can obtain contribution from a tortfeasor liable under a strict
liability theory. Courts in most states that have adopted either the
1939 or 1955 Uniform Act have held that even if liability of two defendants is based on different theories, they may be liable to one another for contribution.2 50 Some courts, however, have refused to recog-

nize that tortfeasors liable under different theories can obtain
5 1
contribution from one another.

Courts that have refused to allow contribution among defendants
whose liability to the plaintiff is dependent upon different theories
hold that contribution is inappropriate because the liability of the de-

249. Another interesting possibility is equitable subrogation. In Reese v. AMFWhitely, 420 F. Supp. 985 (D. Neb. 1976), a minor was injured when a gym bar he was
using collapsed. The minor's father sued the gym bar manufacturer. The manufacturer
then sought contribution from the installer of the gym bar and the doctor who was alleged to have negligently treated the injured minor. The court held that even if the physician who treated the minor were negligent, he was not a joint tortfeasor with the manufacturer and no contribution was available. The court held that negligent medical care
could be viewed as a foreseeable risk arising from the original tortfeasor's actions. The
court further held, however, that if the doctor had been negligent, the defendant manufacturer was subrogated to any claim that the plaintiff would have for malpractice
against the physician. The court stated, "[t]he doctrine of subrogation has been applied
in successive tortfeasor cases when the original wrongdoer has paid damages attributable
not only to his own wrong but to the subsequent aggravation of injuries by the successive
tortfeasor." Id. at 989.
250. See Rabatin v. Columbus Lines, Inc., 790 F.2d 22 (3d Cir. 1986) (applying
Pennsylvania law); Chamberlain v. Carborundum Co., 485 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1973) (applying Pennsylvania law); Pitcavage v. Mastercraft Boat Co., 632 F. Supp. 842 (M.D. Pa.
1985); City of Kingsport v. SCM Corp., 429 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (applying
Tennessee law); W.D. Rubright Co. v. International Harvester Co., 358 F. Supp. 1388
(W.D. Pa. 1973) (applying Pennsylvania law); White v. McKenzie Elec. Coop., Inc., 225
F. Supp. 940 (D.N.D. 1964) (applying North Dakota law); Clark v. Brooks, 377 A.2d 365
(Del. Super. 1977), afl'd sub nom. Blackshear v. Clark, 391 A.2d 747 (Del. 1978); Wallace
v. Strassel, 479 So. 2d 231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 386 Mass.
95, 434 N.E.2d 1008 (1982); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Village of Hewitt, 274 Minn. 246, 143
N.W.2d 230 (1966); Cartel Capital Corp. v. Fireco, 81 N.J. 548, 410 A.2d 674 (1980);
Sanchez v. Espanola, 94 N.M. 676, 615 P.2d 993 (Ct. App. 1980); Svetz v. Land Tool Co.,
355 Pa. Super. 230, 513 A.2d 403 (1986).
251. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Empiregas, Inc., 545 So. 2d 706 (La. Ct. App.
1989).
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fendants is "not on the same legal plane. '252 In Svetz v. Land Tool
Co. ,23 however, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania rejected this notion. In Svetz the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against the
manufacturer of an allegedly defective motorcycle helmet whose defects were claimed to have contributed to the decedent's death. The
manufacturer denied liability and joined as additional defendants a
second motorcyclist who was racing with the decedent at the time of
the accident and a tavern keeper who allegedly had served the decedent alcohol while he was already intoxicated. The trial court "held
joinder improper because plaintiff's claim against the appellant-manufacturer was based on principles of strict liability; whereas, the appellant-manufacturer's claim for contribution from the additional defend'254
ants was based on negligence.
On appeal, the superior court noted that the contribution act was
based on principles of equity and that its purposes would be better
served by allowing the contribution action to proceed. The court held:
The focus of the Uniform Act is on the relationship existing between
tortfeasors rather than the manner in which several tortfeasors have
been held liable to an injured claimant. In Puller v. Puller, 380 Pa.
219, 221, 110 A.2d 175, 177 (1955), the Supreme Court observed that
"contribution is not a recovery for the tort [committed against the
plaintiff,] but the enforcement of an equitable duty to share liability
for the wrong done." Thus, a tortfeasor's right to receive contribution
from a joint tortfeasor derives not from his liability to the claimant
but rather from the equitable principle that once the joint liability of
several tortfeasors has been determined, it would be unfair to impose
the financial burden of the plaintiff's loss on one tortfeasor to the exclusion of the other. It matters not on which theory a tortfeasor has
been held responsible for the tort committed against the plaintiff. So
long as the party seeking contribution has paid in excess of his or her
share of liability, it would be inequitable under the Act to deny that
party's right to contribution from a second tortfeasor who also contributed to the plaintiff's injury.255
In South Carolina, the most compelling argument for allowing contribution in this situation is that joint and several liability both under
the Act and prior to its adoption revolves around the indivisibility of
the injury to the plaintiff, not the nature of the tortfeasors' wrong.25
To determine if parties are jointly and severally liable the court does

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Conti v. Ford Motor Co., 578 F. Supp. 1429, 1435 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
355 Pa. Super. 230, 513 A.2d 403 (1986).
Id. at 237, 513 A.2d at 406-07.
Id. at 238, 513 A.2d at 407 (citations omitted).
See supra notes 221-30 and accompanying text.
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not look to the duty breached, but to the injury caused.25 7 Thus, courts
in other jurisdictions have found common liability for contribution
purposes between tortfeasors whose liability arises by breaches of duties established under different statutes. 25 The Supreme Court of
Massachusetts in Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co. 259 upheld a contribution

claim asserted by a defendant against a co-defendant even though they
were liable under different theories because the Contribution Act's
"concern is with joint liability in tort for the same injury, not with
whether such joint liability is based on the same theory.

' 26 0

The same

approach should allow contribution in similar circumstances under the
South Carolina Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.
Procedurally, a contribution action brought by a defendant liable
to the plaintiff under one theory against a tortfeasor liable under a

different theory should be allowed through impleader. 261 In Pitcavage
v. Mastercraft Boat Co. 262 the plaintiff sued the manufacturers of two

boats that collided alleging that the boats were negligently manufactured and that the manufacturers were liable under negligence, strict
liability, and breach of warranty. Mastercraft, one of the original defendants, filed a third-party action against the operators of the boats,
alleging that their negligence contributed to the accident. The court
held that the third-party complaint was a proper mechanism for asserting a contribution action, even if the theory of liability asserted
against the third-party defendants differed from the theory asserted
against the original defendant. The court held that "[f]or purposes of
Rule 14, it is immaterial that the liability of the third party is not
identical to or rests on a different theory than that underlying plaintiffs' claim.

263

257. See id.
258. See Zontelli Bros. v. Northern Pac. Ry., 263 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1959) (liability
based on Federal Employers Liability Act and Wrongful Death Act); Wallace v. Strassel,
479 So. 2d 231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (liability based on negligence and dog owner
strict liability statute); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Village of Hewitt, 274 Minn. 246, 143
N.W.2d 230 (1966) (liability based on negligence and civil damage act).
259. 386 Mass. 95, 434 N.E.2d 1008 (1982).
260. Id. at 100, 434 N.E.2d at 1011.
261. Whether impleader is proper under the South Carolina Act is a separate question discussed at supra notes 173-216 and accompanying text.
262. 632 F. Supp. 842 (M.D. Pa. 1985). For further discussion of this decision, see
supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
263. Id. at 846-47. For a full discussion of procedural means of asserting a contribution action, see supra notes 173-216 and accompanying text.
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4. Problems Created When a ContributionDefendant is Immune
to Direct Action
An additional problem in establishing the common liability required under the Contribution Act arises when a contribution defendant could not have been sued directly by the plaintiff because it has a
special immunity. The issue thus becomes whether the party protected
by the immunity can be jointly and severally liable for an injury for
which it could not be solely liable. In states that recognize an interspousal immunity or a parent-child immunity, for example, this issue
arises when an alleged tortfeasor seeks contribution from a party who,
because of the immunity, could not be sued by the plaintiff directly.
Most courts addressing the issue of interspousal and parental immunities have concluded that a tortfeasor cannot maintain a contribution action against a person protected by the immunity in question 264
The typical, though certainly not the only, rationale for prohibiting
contribution from protected persons is the absence of common liability
required for contribution. In Welter v. Curry265 the Arkansas Supreme
Court rejected a contribution claim asserted against a minor plaintiff's
parents, stating:
It seems to be well settled that there is no right to contribution under

264. The following decisions have held that interspousal immunity is a bar to a contribution action against the protected spouse: Zurzola v. General Motors Corp., 503 F.2d
403 (3d Cir. 1974) (applying New Jersey law); Yellow Cab Co. v. Dreslin, 181 F.2d 626
(D.C. Cir. 1950); Goldberg v. Faull, 275 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. Tenn. 1967); Blunt v. Brown,
225 F. Supp. 326 (S.D. Iowa 1963); Short Line, Inc. v. Perez, 238 A.2d 341 (Del. Super.
1968); Pennington v. Dye, 456 So. 2d 507 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1984); American Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Molling, 239 Minn. 74, 57 N.W.2d 847 (1953); Martinez v. Lankster, 595 S.W.2d
316 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Moler v. Quality Chevrolet, 2 Ohio App. 3d 120, 440 N.E.2d
1228 (1981); Burmeister v. Youngstrom, 81 S.D. 578, 139 N.W.2d 226 (1965).
The following decisions have held that parental tort immunity is a bar to a contribution action against the protected parent: Hood v. Dealers Transp. Co., 472 F. Supp. 250
(N.D. Miss. 1979); Zaccari v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 50 (D. Md. 1955); Welter v.
Curry, 260 Ark. 287, 539 S.W.2d 264 (1976); Strahorn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 50 Del.
50, 123 A.2d 107 (1956); Howard Concrete Pipe Co. v. Cohen, 139 Ga. App. 491, 229
S.E.2d 8 (1976) (holding that interspousal immunity extends to spouse and to unemancipated child); Pedigo v. Rowley, 101 Idaho 201, 610 P.2d 560 (1980); Paige v. Bing Constr.
Co., 61 Mich. App. 480, 233 N.W.2d 46 (1975); London Guarantee & Accident Co. v.
Smith, 242 Minn. 211, 64 N.W.2d 781 (1954); Kendall v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 634
S.W.2d 176 (Mo. 1982); Smith v. Sapienza, 52 N.Y.2d 82, 417 N.E.2d 530, 436 N.Y.S.2d
236 (1981); Lewis v. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 243 N.C. 55, 89 S.E.2d 788 (1955);
Barry v. Schorling, 2 Ohio App. 3d 110, 440 N.E.2d 1216 (1981); Norfolk S. R.R. v.
Gretakis, 162 Va. 597, 174 S.E. 841 (1934); Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., 105 Wash. 2d
118, 712 P.2d 293 (1986) (en banc); Zutter v. O'Connell, 200 Wis. 601, 229 N.W. 74
(1930).
265. 260 Ark. 287, 539 S.W.2d 264 (1976).
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the act from one who is not liable in tort to the injured person . ..
and the injured party must have a possible remedy against both the
party seeking contribution and the party from whom it is sought. It is
clear that these minor plaintiffs had no remedy against their
parents.268
The rule against allowing contribution in cases in which family immunity exists, however, is not unanimous. Pennsylvania, the "original
dissenter, ' 26 7 has long refused to shield family members from contribution actions asserted by tortfeasors. In Puller v. Puller ss the Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed:
Whatever may be the law in the majority of other jurisdictions, .. it
is established in our own State that a tort-feasor has a right of contribution against a joint tort-feasor even though the judgment creditor
may be the latter's spouse, parent, or minor child; in other words, a
tort-feasor may recover such contribution even though, for some reason, the plaintiff who has obtained a judgment against both of them is
precluded from enforcing liability thereunder against the joint tortfeasor. The theory is that as between the two tort-feasors the contriof an equitabution is not a recovery for the tort but the enforcement
29
ble duty to share liability for the wrong done.
Several states have followed Pennsylvania's lead in rejecting spousal or
parental immunity as a bar to contribution actions. 7 0 Moreover, some
commentators have argued that barring contribution from persons protected by these immunities undermines the policies underlying the
27
right of contribution. '

266. Id. at 298, 539 S.W.2d at 271 (citation omitted).
267. See Note, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors When One Tortfeasor Enjoys Special Defense Against Action By the Injured Party, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 407, 408
(1967).
268. 380 Pa. 219, 110 A.2d 175 (1955).
269. Id. at 221, 110 A.2d at 177 (citations omitted).
270. The following decisions have held that interspousal immunity does not bar a
right of contribution: Winter v. Eon Prod., Ltd., 433 F. Supp. 742 (E.D. La. 1976); Joseph v. Quest, 414 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1982); Wirth v. City of Highland Park, 102 Ill. App.
3d 1074, 430 N.E.2d 236 (1981); Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963);
Noone v. Fink, 222 Mont. 273, 721 P.2d 1275 (1986); Zweifel v. Morgan, 145 N.J. Super.
35, 366 A.2d 1003 (1976); Woods v. Turner, 261 N.C. 643, 135 S.E.2d 664 (1964); Zarrella
v. Miller, 100 R.I. 545, 217 A.2d 673 (1966).
The following decisions have held that parental immunity does not bar a right of
contribution: Perchell v. District of Columbia, 444 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Chinos Villas, Inc. v. Bermudez, 448 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Larson v. Buschkamp,
105 Ill. App. 3d 965, 435 N.E.2d 221 (1982); Walker v. Milton, 263 La. 555, 268 So. 2d
654 (1972); Restifo v. McDonald, 426 Pa. 5, 230 A.2d 199 (1967); Bishop v. Nielson, 632
P.2d 864 (Utah 1981).
271. See, e.g., Hertz, The Tort Triangle: Contribution From Defendants Whom
Plaintiffs Cannot Sue, 32 M. L. REV. 83 (1980); Note, supra note 267; Note, Immunity to
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Although South Carolina does not recognize interspousal 7 2 or a
parental 27 3 immunity in tort actions, it does provide statutory immunity for employers in a tort action brought by employees for injuries
received in the scope of employment. 74 Courts in other jurisdictions
overwhelmingly hold that a tortfeasor cannot obtain contribution from
an employer shielded from an employee's direct suit.27 5 South Carolina,

Direct Action: Is It a Defense to a ContributionClaim?, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 151 (1980).
Hertz summarizes the case against allowing an immunity to interfere with a right of
contribution, stating:
[W]hile contribution is based on the claiming tortfeasor's discharge of a common obligation to the plaintiff, the definition of this obligation should not depend on the plaintiff's ability to enforce legal liability against both tortfeasors.
Rather, contribution rests on broader notions of fairness in the division of the
burden of damages between persons participating in tortious acts or omissions
which result in injury to the plaintiff. Where the protected tortfeasor enjoys a
defense against the plaintiff, the court should resolve the conflict between the
equitable basis of contribution and the purposes underlying the protected
tortfeasor's defense against the plaintiff.
Hertz, supra, at 83-84.
272. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-5-170 (Law. Co-op. 1976); Oshiek v. Oshiek, 244 S.C.
249, 136 S.E.2d 303 (1964).
273. Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132, 268 S.E.2d 109 (1980).
274. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-540 (Law. Co-op. 1976) ("The rights and remedies
granted by this Title to an employee ... exclude all other rights and remedies of such
employee, his personal representative, parents, dependents or next of kin as against his
employer, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service or
death."),
275. See Drake v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1007 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1126 (1986); Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979); Dulin v. Circle F Indus., Inc., 558 F.2d 456 (8th Cir. 1977); Hill
Lines, Inc. v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 222 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1955); General Elec. Co.
v. United States, 603 F. Supp. 881 (D. Md. 1985); Orion Ins. Co. v. United Tech. Corp.,
475 F. Supp. 607 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Lewis v. Chemetron Corp., 448 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Pa.
1978); Shields v. Bechtel Power Corp., 439 F. Supp. 192 (D. Wyo. 1977); Harm v. Standard Eng'g Co., 416 F. Supp. 1168 (D.S.D. 1976); Prosky v. National Acme Co., 404 F.
Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Jennings. v. Franz Torwegge Mach. Works, 347 F. Supp.
1288 (W.D. Va. 1972); Union Carbide Corp. v. Dunn Bros. Gen. Contractors, Inc., 294 F.
Supp. 704 (M.D. Tenn. 1968); Therrien v. Safeguard Mfg. Co., 35 Conn. Supp. 268, 408
A.2d 273 (Super. Ct. 1979); Powell v. Interstate Vendaway, Inc., 300 A.2d 241 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1972); Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Smith, 359 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1978); Georgia
State Tel. Co. v. Scarboro, 148 Ga. App. 390, 251 S.E.2d 309 (1978); Hirasa v. Burtner,
68 Haw. 22, 702 P.2d 772 (1985); Thompson v. Stearns Chem. Corp., 345 N.W.2d 131
(Iowa 1984); Houk v. Arrow Drilling Co., 201 Kan. 81, 439 P.2d 146 (1968); Employers
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Griffin Constr. Co., 280 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1955); Waggoner v. Kellogg-Moore Oil Co., 375 So. 2d 197 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Hake v. Soo Line Ry., 258
N.W.2d 576 (Minn. 1977); State ex. rel. Maryland Heights Concrete Contractors, Inc. v.
Ferriss, 588 S.W.2d 489 (Mo. 1979); Cordier v. Stetson-Ross, Inc., 184 Mont. 502, 604
P.2d 86 (1979); Vangreen v. Interstate Mach. & Supply Co., 197 Neb. 29, 246 N.W.2d 652
(1976); William H. Field Co. v. Nuroco Woodwork, Inc., 115 N.H. 632, 348 A.2d 716
(1975); Schweizer v. Elox Div. of Colt Indus., 70 N.J. 280, 359 A.2d 857 (1976); Johnson
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however, has an express provision in its
under which an injured employee's claim
reduced by the amount of compensation
the Workers' Compensation Act.2 76 This
"the third person's right to enforce such
'277
ployer should thereupon be satisfied.
E.

Workers' Compensation Act
against a third party may be
paid by the employer under
provision further states that
contribution against the em-

Statute of Limitations Issues

The Uniform Act has spawned considerable litigation regarding
statutes of limitations issues. Because the South Carolina Contribution
Act is virtually identical to the Uniform Act, decisions from other jurisdictions addressing statute of limitations issues under the Act provide a useful guide for determining the course that Scuth Carolina
courts are likely to follow. Additionally, many of the common-law contribution decisions of other jurisdictions offer a framework for analyzing the South Carolina Act.
1.

Limitations of Actions Under the South Carolina Act

The South Carolina Act traces the language of the Uniform Act in
its provisions providing for a limitations period. Section 15-38-40(C)
states: "If there is a judgment for the injury or wrongful death against
the tortfeasor seeking contribution, any separate action by him to enforce contribution must be commenced within one year after the judgment has become final by lapse of time for appeal or after appellate
review."2 78 The one-year limitations provision in subsection (C) for
contribution claimants against whom a judgment has become final represents a compromise 27 9 between starting the statute of limitations period when a contribution claimant has paid more than his pro rata
share of the common liability2s0 and starting the limitations period

v. Catlett, 246 N.C. 341, 98 S.E.2d 458 (1957); Gernand v. Ost Serv. Inc., 298 N.W.2d 500
(N.D. 1980); Harter Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Harris, 592 P.2d 526 (Okla. 1979); General
Elevator Corp. v. Champion Papers, 590 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979); Curtis v. Harmon Elec., Inc., 552 P.2d 117 (Utah 1976); Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete
Co., 91 Wash. 2d 230, 588 P.2d 1308 (1978); Jenkins v. Sabourin, 104 Wis. 2d 309, 311
N.W.2d 600 (1981).
276. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-580 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
277. Id.
278. Id. § 15-38-40(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
279. UNIF. AcT (1955), supra note 125, § 3 commissioners' comment to subsection
(a), at 90.
280. Numerous courts have held that the statute of limitations period does not begin until actual payment of a judgment by a contribution claimant. See, e.g., Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Feld Car & Truck Leasing Corp., 517 F. Supp. 1132 (D. Kan. 1981); Bradford

Published by Scholar Commons, 1990

47

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 4
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 41
when judgment is merely entered. 28 1 The rationale for not beginning
the statute of limitations period until judgment is actually paid is that
a statute of limitations period cannot begin to run until a claimant has
accrued a right to seek contribution. This right, even under the South
Carolina Contribution Act, does not exist until a tortfeasor "has paid
more than his pro rata share of the common liability. 's 82 To begin the
statute of limitations before a tortfeasor pays more than its share of a
judgment would, in essence, punish a party for sitting on rights he has
not yet acquired. Thus, triggering this statute upon payment is consistent with the traditional view that contribution is a separate cause of
action and with the notion that a limitations period is designed in part
to punish those who fail to exercise accrued rights within a reasonable
time.
In addition to fostering doctrinal consistency, this view protects
the contribution claimant from potential unfairness resulting from the
statute's expiration prior to payment of the judgment. If a claimant
must pay a judgment before bringing a contribution action, then the
claimant's ability to trigger contribution rights and thereby avoid running afoul of the limitations depends on whether the claimant can pay
the judgment shortly after becoming liable for it. If, for example, a
party is sued and becomes liable for a judgment, the party's inability
to discharge the judgment for a year would defeat the right to receive
contribution if a six-month statute of limitations were to begin running
2 3
upon entry of judgment.

v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 588 F. Supp. 708 (S.D.W. Va. 1984); Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co. v. R. Herschel Mfg. Co., 453 F. Supp. 1375 (D.N.D. 1978); Kriz v. Buckeye

Petroleum Co., 145 Ariz. 374, 701 P.2d 1182 (1985); Schiess v. Bates, 107 Idaho 794, 693
P.2d 440 (1984); Commonwealth v. All Points Constr. Co., 566 S.W.2d 171 (Ky. Ct. App.

1977); Thomas v. W & W Clarklift, Inc., 375 So. 2d 375 (La. 1979); Sziber v. Stout, 419
Mich. 514, 358 N.W.2d 330 (1984); In re Estate of Morse, 364 N.W.2d 842 (Minn. Ct.

App. 1985); Biddle v. Biddle, 163 N.J. Super. 455, 395 A.2d 218 (Super. Ct. Law. Div.

1978); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Southbridge Towers, Inc., 101 A.D.2d 434, 476 N.Y.S.2d
299 (1984); Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. v. Priewe, 118 Wis. 2d 318, 348 N.W.2d 585 (Ct.

App. 1984).
281. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-40(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); ITT
Rayonier, Inc. v. Southeastern Maritime Co., 620 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying
Georgia law); Showell Indus., Inc. v. Holmes County, 409 So. 2d 78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

1982); Ward Dev. Co., Inc. v. Ingrao, 63 Md. App. 645, 493 A.2d 421 (1985); Rowland v.
Scaggs Cos., 666 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. 1984); Godfrey v. Tidewater Power Co., 223 N.C. 647,
27 S.E.2d 736 (1943).
282. S.C. CODE

ANN.

§ 15-38-20(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).

283. The commissioners' comments to the Uniform Act note that a primary reason
for not restricting the limitations period to six months from the date of judgment was
that the short period would "restrict the right to contribution to those who can raise the

money to pay off the judgment immediately." UNiF. AcT (1955), supra note 125, § 3
commissioners' comment to subsection (C), at 89.
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On the other hand, starting the limitations period upon actual
payment undermines the very purpose of a time limitation,2 84 which is
to protect potential defendants by shielding them from extended periods of uncertainty concerning exposure to suit, by supporting acts (including the disposal of evidence), done in reasonable reliance upon potential plaintiffs' inaction and especially by preventing the institution
of lawsuits at times when defendants would be disadvantaged
due to
2 5
their inability to obtain evidence to support their defenses.
By triggering the contribution limitations period upon payment, a
court would allow a tortfeasor to prejudice a co-tortfeasor by refusing
to make payment for an extended period of time after entry of the
judgment.
The Uniform Act's compromise, which South Carolina adopted,
protects the tortfeasor held liable by providing a one-year period after
final judgment in which to commence an enforcement action. 2 6 The
Act, therefore, gives the claimant a reasonable period in which to pay
the judgment, thus triggering the claimant's rights under the Act, without unduly prejudicing co-tortfeasors who may be held liable for their
pro rata shares of the judgment.
2. Limitations Period Applicable to a ContributionAction
If a plaintiff brings suit promptly and a defendant seeks contribution immediately thereafter, the limitation period of the Act does not
pose difficulties. Very often, however, the statute of limitations for the
plaintiff's underlying cause of action against a contribution defendant
will have expired long before the contribution action is initiated. A
contribution defendant will then maintain that contribution is barred
by the limitations period applicable to that specific wrong. Courts interpreting both common-law and statutory contribution, however, generally have held that a contribution action does not have to be brought
28 7
within the limitations period applicable to the underlying action.

284. The Commissioners for the 1955 Uniform Act addressed this criticism of the
1939 Uniform Act, stating:
Where there is a short statute of limitations, as in most malpractice cases and
in some states as to all personal injuries, this extension defeats the whole purpose of the short statute, by adding the time necessary to bring the first suit to
judgment, and an additional period for the contribution suit.

Id.
285. Kutner, Contribution Among Tort-feasors: The Effects of Statutes of Limitations and Other Time Limitations, 33 OKL& L. REV. 203, 214 (1980).
286. See UNIF. Ac' (1955), supra note 125, § 3(c); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-20(C)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
287. See, e.g., ITT Rayonier, Inc. v. Southeastern Maritime Co., 620 F.2d 512 (5th
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Most courts addressing this issue begin with the premise that an
action for contribution is a separate action between two or more
tortfeasors that is triggered when one tortfeasor is required to pay
more than his fair share of the liability, not when the act giving rise to
the underlying liability occurs. Accordingly, a separate statute of limitations for co-tortfeasors seeking contribution makes sense. One commentator expressed the following rationale for providing a separate
cause of action and a separate statute of limitations for contribution
actions:
In one respect, tortfeasor plaintiffs are less deserving than victim
plaintiffs. They are ex hypothesi wrongdoers attempting to shift the
losses they have caused, not victims attempting to obtain compensation for harm caused by tortfeasors. .

.

. Nevertheless, tortfeasor

plaintiffs who desire contribution labor under a disadvantage that victim plaintiffs do not: the inability to commence an action without
having been sued by (or settled with) a third-party (the victim). Furthermore, contribution defendants are definitely entitled to the benefit of one period of limitation-that applying to causes of action for
contribution-and may not deserve the benefits of a second limitation-that applying to the victims' actions for damages. One can at
least decide that the hardship of being denied contribution outweighs
the hardship of being sued after the limitation period applicable to
the victim's claim has expired.
.. . Fairness to plaintiffs requires that they be given a reasonable
opportunity to sue before time runs out. This opportunity is unavailable to tortfeasors sued by victims at the end of a limitation period
unless the running of the statute of limitations on the victims' causes
of action does not have the effect of barring contribution.288
The general rule providing for a separate statute of limitations for contribution actions that, in essence, overrides a statute of limitations for

Cir. 1980); Premier Corp. v. Economic Research Analysis, Inc., 578 F.2d 551 (4th Cir.
1978); Al-Hazmi v. City of Waukegan, 579 F. Supp. 1441 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Bradford v.
Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 588 F. Supp. 708 (S.D.W. Va. 1984); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Feld
Car & Truck Leasing Corp., 517 F. Supp. 1132 (D. Kan. 1981); Thornton v. Town of
Hull, 515 F. Supp. 715 (D. Mass. 1981); City of Kingsport v. SCM Corp., 429 F. Supp. 96
(E.D. Tenn. 1976); Kriz v. Buckeye Petroleum Co., 145 Ariz. 374, 701 P.2d 1182 (1985);
Showell Indus. v. Holmes County, 409 So. 2d 778 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Schiess v.
Bates, 107 Idaho 794, 693 P.2d 440 (1984); Commonwealth v. All Points Constr. Co., 566
SW.2d 171 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); Thomas v. W & W Clarklift, Inc., 375 So. 2d 375 (La.
1979); Tadjer v. Montgomery County, 61 Md. App. 492, 487 A.2d 658 (1985); Sziber v.
Stout, 419 Mich. 514, 358 N.W.2d 330 (1984); In re Estate of Morse, 364 N.W.2d 842
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Tetens v. Elston Realty Corp., 108 A.D.2d 981, 484 N.Y.S.2d 966
(1985).
288. Kutner, supra note 285, at 215-16 (footnotes omitted).
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actions on the original injury has been adapted to many different situations.289 The rule applies as well in third-party contribution actions as
it does in contribution actions brought after entry or collection of
judgment."'
3.

When Limitations Periods Collide: How to Apply the
ContributionAct

Application of the contribution statute of limitations becomes difficult when the statute of limitations on the plaintiff's original claim
against the contribution defendant expired before the plaintiff initiated his original action against the contribution claimant. The issue is
whether the contribution claimant can recover contribution from a cotortfeasor who is protected from a suit by the original plaintiff because
the statute of limitations on that action has expired.
A situation in which two defendants are alleged to be jointly liable
for the same injury, but are protected by statutes of limitations of differing lengths is not uncommon. It often arises, for example, when one
defendant is a governmental entity. 91 The limitations periods are
often different, as well, when the plaintiff sues one of the defendants
under a statutory cause of action with a specified time in which the
action must be commenced. 92 Many statutes also provide different
limitation periods for actions brought under different theories of recovery.2 93 In South Carolina, for example, the legislature has provided a

289. In a comprehensive law review article, Professor Kutner has identified 14 hypothetical cases in which contribution statutes of limitations could conflict with other statutes of limitations or notice requirements. This article is a helpful reference for determining the outcome of a fact-specific scenario. See Kutner, supra note 285, at 206-65.
290. See ITT Rayonier, Inc., 620 F.2d 512; Al-Hazmi, 579 F. Supp. 1441; Tri-Ex
Enters., 586 F. Supp. 930; Thornton, 515 F. Supp. 715; Department of Transportation v.
General Portland, Inc., 443 So. 2d 276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Showell Indus. v.
Holmes County, 409 So. 2d 78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Evans v. Lukas, 140 Ga. App.
182, 230 S.E.2d 136 (1976); Matt v. Cox, 408 So. 2d 389 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Tadger, 61
Md. App. 492, 487 A.2d 658; Sziber, 419 Mich. 514, 358 N.W.2d 330; Biddle v. Biddle,
163 N.J. Super. 455, 395 A.2d 218 (Law. Div. 1978); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Southbridge
Towers, Inc., 101 A.D. 2d 434, 476 N.Y.S.2d 299 (1984); L.B. Smith, Inc. v. Circle Air
Freight Corp., 128 Misc. 2d 12, 488 N.Y.S.2d 547 (Sup. Ct. 1985); Hughes v. Pron, 286
Pa. Super. 419, 429 A.2d 9 (1981).
291. See e.g., Showell Indus., 409 So. 2d 78 (action filed after expiration of statute
of limitations for claims against the state or its political subdivisions); All Points Constr.
Co., 566 S.W.2d 171 (action brought after expiration of statute of limitations applicable
to claims against the Commonwealth).
292. See, e.g., ITT Rayonier,Inc., 620 F.2d 512 (Carriage of Goods By Sea Act); AlHazmi, 579 F. Supp. 1441 (Dram Shop Act).
293. See, e.g., Thornton, 515 F. Supp. 715 (admiralty action); Rivera v. Philadelphia
Theological Seminary of St. Charles Borromeo, Inc., 326 Pa. Super. 509, 474 A.2d 605
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wide variety of limitations periods for different actions, depending
upon the type of action and category of defendant.1

4

a. Fulfilling the Common Liability Requirement
When differing limitations periods exist, the threshold question is
whether the contribution defendant falls within the joint and several
liability requirement of the statute. The rule is now settled that the
Contribution Act's requirement of joint and several liability is fulfilled
if co-tortfeasors are jointly liable at the time the plaintiff's cause of
action accrues. Even if one of the defendants is no longer liable directly to the plaintiff, that defendant may still be liable to pay contribution. An Arkansas federal district court addressed this issue in
Schott v. Colonial Baking Co. 295 The plaintiff in Schott alleged that

two defendants were jointly and severally liable in negligence for causing injury to the plaintiff. The district court dismissed the plaintiff's
action against one of the defendants because service of process was not
properly executed during the three-year statute of limitations period
applicable to negligence actions. 2 6 The remaining defendant then
sought contribution from the dismissed defendant in a third-party action. The third-party defendant contended, however, that, since the
original plaintiff's action against it had been dismissed, it was no
longer directly liable to the plaintiff and, therefore, could not be sub29 7
ject to "common liability" with the third-party plaintiff.
The court refused to dismiss the contribution action. The court
noted, by analogy, that if the plaintiff had executed a valid release of
the third-party defendant, the third-party defendant would nevertheless be liable for contribution to the third-party plaintiff. This would
be true even though, by virtue of the release, the original plaintiff
would have had no claim against the third-party defendant. The court
continued:
There is little difference, if any, in permitting a plaintiff to select the
defendant whom he might desire to collect from by intentionally or
unintentionally forfeiting his right of action against one of the joint
tort-feasors, as the plaintiff has done in the instant case, and in permitting a plaintiff to select the defendant by releasing his cause of
action against another defendant. Stated differently, plaintiff's action
in allowing the statute of limitations to run as against the third party

(1984) (wrongful death action), afl'd as modified, 510 Pa. 1, 507 A.2d 1 (1986).
294. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-3-510 to -670 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1989).
295. 111 F. Supp. 13 (W.D. Ark. 1953).
296. Id. at 18.
297. Id. at 16.
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defendants . . . was the equivalent of executing a release to the third
party defendants and should not prevent the third party plaintiff
from exercising its right of contribution. 9 8
The court in City of Kingsport v. SCM Corp.299 reached the same
holding under similar facts. In City of Kingsport the plaintiff sued two
defendants alleging that they were jointly and severally liable for the
same harm. Because the action was instituted after the three-year statute of limitations had expired, the court dismissed one of the defendants. The other defendant, however, could not avail itself of the statute
of limitations bar because it had induced the plaintiff into delaying the
initiation of the lawsuit. The remaining defendant then initiated a
third-party action seeking contribution from the dismissed defendant.3 0 0 The third-party defendant contended that it could not be held
liable for contribution because the statute of limitations barred any
action against it by the plaintiff, and that the remaining defendant's
waiver of the statute of limitations was personal to that defendant and
could not operate to permit a third-party contribution action against
the dismissed defendant. The district court rejected the third-party defendant's argument and held that the common liability requirement in
a contribution action is relevant only to the time when the original
301
plaintiff's claim arose.
Courts holding that the common liability inquiry should be limited
to the time when the plaintiff's cause of action arose distinguish accrual of the "right to contribution" and the accrual of a contribution
"cause of action." The right to contribution arises at the commission of
a joint tort and cannot be defeated by a plaintiff's release of one defendant or by the expiration of the statute of limitations relating to
one defendant. A contribution cause of action arises either when judgment is entered against one defendant or when one defendant pays
more than his fair share of the common liability.30 2 In Godfrey v. Tidewater Power Co. 3 0 3 the court noted that common liability must exist as
a "condition precedent to contribution, but it is not essential that it

298. Id. at 23. The court in Godfrey v. Tidewater Power Co., 223 N.C. 647, 27 S.E.2d
736 (1943), drew a similar analogy, stating, "Indeed, the right of contribution may be
enforced after liability to the injured person or his representative has been extinguished
by the payment of the judgment and its transfer to a trustee for the benefit of the paying
judgment debtor." Id. at 649, 27 S.E.2d at 737.
299. 429 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
300. Id. at 97-98.
301. Id. at 100.
302. See supra notes 280-81 and accompanying text. This distinction also has been

applied in considering retroactive application of the Act. See Lightner v. Duke Power
Co., 719 F. Supp. 1310 (D.S.C. 1989).

303. 223 N.C. 647, 27 S.E.2d 736 (1943).
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should continue to subsist, or be kept alive, against all of the joint tortfeasors. '' 30 4 The court further noted:
The right accrues when judgment is obtained in an action arising out
of a joint tort. From this it follows that a contingent or inchoate right
to enforce contribution arises to each defendant tort-feasor at the
time of the institution of the action to recover on the joint tort. As
long then as the plaintiff's right to recover in such suit remains undetermined, the contingent or inchoate right of each defendant tort-feasor to enforce contribution continues and, on rendition of judgment in
favor of the plaintiff, this right matures into a cause of action. Thus, it
is rooted in and springs from the plaintiff's suit and projects itself
beyond that suit, but is not dependent on the plaintiff's continued
right to sue all the joint tort-feasors 0 l

b. Preserving the ContributionAction Prior to Accrual
Courts holding that the right to contribution does not die when
the plaintiff's underlying cause of action becomes barred by a statute
of limitations are conceptually consistent with the holdings of many
courts that an action for contribution cannot expire before it is born.306
The case most often cited for this proposition is Keleket X-ray Corp.
v. United States.307 In Keleket the plaintiff sued the United States and
a private party. A three-year statute of limitations was applicable to
suits between private parties, but a two-year statute of limitations applied to suits against the United States. The plaintiff brought his action after two years but before the three year period had expired. The
district court dismissed the plaintiff's claims against the United States.

The private party defendant brought a third-party claim against the
United States for contribution, which the district court dismissed.""
The issue on appeal was whether the district court properly dis-

304. Id. at 649, 27 S.E.2d at 737.
305. Id. at 649-50, 27 S.E.2d at 738 (citation omitted).
306. The South Carolina Contribution Statute, like the Uniform Act, does not entirely resolve the dilemma of allowing a right to expire before it accrues. The statute
provides for a one-year contribution limitations period when a judgment becomes final.
S,C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-40(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). The actual right to contribution,
however, does not accrue until a tortfeasor "has paid more than his pro-rata share of the
common liability." Id. § 15-38-20(B). Thus, a contribution claimant who does not pay
more than his share of a judgment within one year of when it becomes final will have lost
the right before it accrued. This provision of the statute, as noted earlier, effects a compromise necessary to prevent a contribution claimant from prejudicing a contribution
defendant by delaying payment of a judgment for an extended period of time. See supra
notes 278-86 and accompanying text.
307. 275 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
308. Id. at 168.
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missed the private party defendant's third-party claim against United
States. The district court had held that a defendant may recover contribution from a joint tortfeasor only if the joint tortfeasor is directly
liable to the injured party. It held that, because the statute of limitations for bringing an action against the United States had expired at
the time the private party defendant sought to recover indemnity from
the United States, the United States was not directly liable to the injured party.30 9 It could not, therefore, be held liable for contribution to
the private party defendant.3 10 The court of appeals rejected the reasoning of the district court and held that the private party defendant's
claim to contribution "did not accrue before [that party] had been
sued by [the plaintiff]. '3 '1 The court noted that it knew of "no reason
why the law should let action or inaction of the injured party defeat a
33 2
claim to contribution.
c.

Controlling the Plaintiff's Choice of Defendant

In addressing the potential effect that a plaintiff could have on a
future action between joint tortfeasors, the court in Keleket strikes the
note that brings harmony to the cases addressing this issue. The harmony lies in the rejection of a plaintiff's right to choose the defendant
from whom he will collect a judgment. Prior to the adoption of a right
of contribution in South Carolina, for example, plaintiffs had the explicit right to elect whom they would sue. 3 Allowing the plaintiff to
retain this right would undermine the intent of the Contribution Act to
provide a fair allocation of liability among joint tortfeasors." 4 If the

309. Id. at 169.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 169. Of course, in most jurisdictions a claim to contribution arises upon
either entry of judgment or payment of more than one's pro rata share of the liability.
See supra notes 280-81 and accompanying text.
312. Keleket, 275 F.2d at 169.
313. See Hills v. Price, 79 F. Supp. 494 (E.D.S.C. 1948).
314. In a prefatory note to the 1955 Uniform Act, the commissioners stated:
Under the existing law an injured person may select whom he wishes to
sue from among those jointly liable to him for an injury. He need not sue all.
He may settle out of court or he may sue all and collect the full amount of the
judgment from one. Under the prevailing law rule there is no recourse by one
who voluntarily pays or who is forced to pay the common liability, against the
others who are equally liable to the injured party but who have escaped
payment.
This act would distribute the burden of responsibility equitable among
those who are jointly liable and thus avoid the injustice often resulting under
the common laN.
UNiF. ACT (1955), supra note 125, commissioners' prefatory note, at 59; see also Commonwealth v. All Points Constr. Co., 566 S.W.2d 171, 173 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (starting
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Keleket court had held, for example, that the third-party action was
barred by the statute of limitations for actions against government entities, the plaintiff could effectively release the government defendant
by waiting until after the shorter limitation periods had run to initiate
the original action. The right of the remaining defendant to receive
3 15
contribution from the government would then be defeated.
d. Reconciling Inconsistencies in Legislative Intent
As the above discussion demonstrates, legislative intent is often

contribution statute of limitations not from time of commission of tort, but from time of
payment). The All Points Constr. court's rationale was "to prevent an injured party
from foreclosing a tortfeasor's right of contribution by waiting to bring his action until
just before the statute of limitations ran on his claim, leaving the tortfeasor helpless to
save his right of contribution." Id. at 173. The Michigan Supreme Court in Sziber v.
Stout, 419 Mich. 514, 358 N.W.2d 330 (1984), also refused to allow the contribution statute of limitations to be manipulated by the plaintiff's time of filing suit, stating:
to hold otherwise would ... effectively permit a plaintiff to choose which of
several possible defendants would bear the entire burden of paying a judgment
simply by filing his lawsuit before the expiration of the three-year statute of
limitations applicable to private tortfeasors, but after expiration of the twoyear statute applicable to governmental units, and would thereby substantially
limit the effectiveness of the contribution statute.
Id. at 536, 358 N.W.2d at 339.
315. The right to contribution could also be defeated if both defendants were subject to the same statute of limitations on the original action and the plaintiff waited until
just before the statute expired to bring an action. In such a case, the defendant sued
would not have time to assert his contribution right before it was lost. See All Points
Constr., 566 S.W.2d at 173; Kutner, supra note 285, at 213-14. Additionally, the problem
of allowing a plaintiff to choose his defendant is not limited to plaintiffs who consciously
avoid suing a certain defendant. See, e.g., City of Kingsport v. SCM Corp., 429 F. Supp.
96 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (plaintiff sued two defendants after statute of limitations had expired, but court held one defendant had waived the bar); Schott v. Colonial Baking Co.,
111 F. Supp. 13 (W.D. Ark. 1953) (plaintiff sued two defendants within the limitations
period, but service of one was not proper and was not made proper within the limitations
period). Although plaintiffs often have strategic or jurisdictional reasons for keeping a
certain defendant out of litigation, more typically the omission would arise from accident, rather than calculation. See Kutner, supra note 285, at 213-14. As stated by Professor Kutner:
Given the inevitable lapse of time before [a defendant] can commence thirdparty proceedings for contribution-particularly if Victim can commence an
action by means other than actual service of process upon [the defendant]-last-minute commencement of Victim's suit will deprive [that defendant] of the opportunity to obtain contribution. Perhaps few victims commence
suit with the purpose of depriving defendants of contribution, but 'eleventhhour' tort actions are so common that the objects of the contribution statutes
would be substantially frustrated if the effect were to foreclose the remedy of
contribution.
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used to prevent a statute of limitations for an underlying action from
undermining the effectiveness of contribution. Legislative intent, however, also has been used to prevent a contribution statute from undermining the effectiveness of a limitations period for a certain cause of
action or class of defendant. In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Architectural Management, Inc.3 16 the Illinois Court of Appeals used the
legislative intent behind a construction law statute of limitations to
preclude an otherwise timely contribution action. In that case the
plaintiff brought a suit alleging construction defects within the twelveyear limitations period prescribed by the statute. After expiration of
the twelve-year period, one of the defendants asserted a third-party
complaint for contribution against several contribution defendants.
The third-party defendants contended that even though the limitations period for a contribution action had not yet begun to run, the
contribution action should, nonetheless, be dismissed because it was
brought after expiration of the twelve-year period applicable to conthe third-party defendstruction lawsuits. The lower court dismissed
3 17
ants, and the court of appeals affirmed.
The court of appeals conducted a lengthy analysis of the legislative intent behind the construction law statute of limitations. The
court noted that during debates over the construction law statute, its
opponents specifically noted that the bill would preclude indemnity actions brought by building owners against architects or construction
companies responsible for construction defects. The court held that the
purpose of the legislation was "to protect persons involved in the design and construction of buildings from potentially unlimited liability
..
,' The court stated:
Excepting contribution actions from the purview of [the construction
law statute of limitations] could in many instances result in the contravention of this stated purpose-as can easily be seen from the following example proffered by [the contribution defendant]. Assuming
that within 10 years after the renovation of an 80-year-old building,
an injury occurs which is determined to have been caused by the combination of latent original and newly discovered renovation design defects, although the plaintiff could not bring a direct action against the
original architect by reason of [the construction law statute], under
[the contribution claimant's] reasoning the renovation architect
would, despite the passage of approximately 90 years, nevertheless be
able to bring a contribution action against him as a joint tortfeasor.
However unlikely such a situation might seem, the fact that it is pos-

2d 543, 517 N.E. 2d
316. 158 Ill.
App. 3d 515, 511 N.E.2d 706, cert. denied, 117 Ill.
1086 (1987).
317. Id. at 521, 511 N.E.2d at 710.
318. Id. at 519, 511 N.E.2d at 709.
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sible illustrates the fundamental flaw in [the contribution claimant's]
reasoning.319
To accept the reasoning of Hartford Fire is to reject the concept
that contribution is a separate action between different parties than
those involved in the underlying action. The reasoning of this case also
runs afoul of the contribution statute's purpose: to prevent a plaintiff
from choosing its defendant.3 10 The same reasoning could support precluding a contribution action after expiration of a short statute of limitations provided for a governmental entity or for a special class of defendants, or after expiration of a limitations period applicable to a
multitude of different statutory torts. Thus, although the Hartford
Fire court dealt with the specific language of the construction-law statute at issue, its holding arguably has broader implications.
The fundamental fallacy of the Hartford Fire court is that it confused the cause of action based on contribution with a cause of action
based on the construction law statute. The court failed to recognize a
contribution action as separate from the lawsuit over the construction
defect. The Contribution Act, however, is intended to create an equitable cause of action to prevent unfairness to one tortfeasor held liable
for more than his fair share of damages that accrue from a factual setting entirely separate from the contribution claim.
In Rowland v. Skaggs Cos. 32 1 the Supreme Court of Missouri, addressing the effect that the expiration of a medical malpractice statute
of limitations should have on a later contribution action, recognized
that the contribution lawsuit was separate from actions filed pursuant
to the medical malpractice statute. The court stated that the medical
malpractice statute protected providers of health care against stale
claims from health care consumers, but did not prevent a fair apportionment of damages among co-tortfeasors. The court stated:
It makes no difference that the claim for contribution arises ancillary
to a suit subject to [the medical malpractice statute]. By definition, a
suit for contribution among tortfeasors must arise from some underlying tort action. Both our decisions and decisions from other jurisdictions demonstrate that this does not alter the independent nature of

319. Id. at 519-20, 511 N.E.2d at 709. The Hartford Fire hypothetical, though extreme, underscores the tension that inevitably develops between contribution statutes of

limitations and statutes of limitations for other causes of action. Often, a contribution
action will be brought within the limitations period prescribed for such a suit, but after

the limitations period on the other underlying cause of action has expired. In such a case
the contribution defendant will be forced to defend an action based on conduct that

occurred many years before. In several ways, this undermines the policies that underlie
statutes of limitations. See supra notes 284-85 and accompanying text.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 313-15.
321. 666 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. 1984).
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the cause of action for contribution. We are not persuaded the legislature contemplated subjecting to [the medical malpractice statute]
suits which, while arising from the same factual setting as a suit governed by the statute, are substantively distinguishable from the actions for damages enumerated by the statute. 22
The holding in Rowland represents the better view because it is more
consistent with the general principles of contribution law. Accordingly,
this rule should prevail under South Carolina's contribution statute,
along with a candid recognition that, in enacting the statute, the legislature intended to expose tortfeasors to longer periods of liability for
actions among themselves than to actions between a victim and a
tortfeasor. Despite its recognition that allowing a contribution action
many years after expiration of the statute of limitations for the Illinois
Dram Shop Act would inconvenience many tortfeasors, a federal district court in an Illinois case, Al-Hazmi v. City of Waukegan, 3 ' held:
[The Illinois] legislature has spoken in unambiguous terms in the
Contribution Act [in setting a two-year limitation period for actions
under that Act], and it has spoken long after it created the cause of
action under the Dram Shop Act. Perhaps it is anomalous that a party
may be vulnerable to liability in contribution to a fellow wrongdoer
far longer than to the party whom it has wronged, but that anomaly is
no greater in dram shop cases than in ordinary tort cases-and most
importantly it is an anomaly the Illinois General Assembly has chosen
to create. 22'
To hold otherwise would require a court to venture away from the
rules defining the nature of a contribution action and would engender
useless and costly litigation over which statutes of limitations should
supersede the contribution statute of limitations.
F.

The Effects of Settlement on the Right to Contribution

The effect of a settlement between a plaintiff and one or more
jointly liable tortfeasors has presented some of the most difficult issues
in the area of contribution.2 2 5 South Carolina Code sections 15-38-

322. Id. at 774; accord Commonwealth v. All Points Constr. Co., 566 S.W.2d 171
(Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (statute of limitations applying to actions against government did not
prevail over contribution statute of limitations). The court in All Points Constr. stated
that "[flar from doing violence to legislative design, this approach avoids imputing to the
legislature the illogical intent to cut off a right of action before it accrues." Id. at 173.
323. 579 F. Supp. 1441 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
324. Id. at 1446.
325. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 309 (4th ed. 1971).
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20(D) 3 26 and 15-38-5032 ' set forth the rules regarding contribution

when a settlement occurs. Section 15-38-20(D) deals with the settling
tortfeasor's right contribution from the nonsettling co-tortfeasors, and
section 15-38-50 addresses the effect on co-tortfeasors of the settling
tortfeasor's release or covenant not to sue. The two primary issues that
have arisen in the settlement area, both which are addressed in the
South Carolina Act, are the following: (1) whether the nonsettling
tortfeasors are entitled to contribution from the settling tortfeasor who
paid less than a pro rata share; and (2) whether the settling tortfeasor
is entitled to contribution from the nonsettling tortfeasors.
1. Nonsettling Tortfeasors' Right to Contribution
from the Settling Tortfeasor
Since settling tortfeasors sometimes pay less than their actual
share of liability, the drafters of the Uniform Act had to determine
who should bear the loss of the difference between settling tortfeasors'
share of liability and the amount they actually paid. As a means of
distributing this loss, the Act could have contained any one of three
options. 328 The first option, which saddles the settling defendant with

the loss, reduces the plaintiff's total claim by the amount of the settlement and allows the nonsettling tortfeasors to seek contribution from
the settling tortfeasor in the amount that his share exceeds the settlement amount.3 29 A second approach places the loss on the nonsettling

326. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-20(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
327. Id. § 15-38-50.
328. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A comment m (1977); see Comment,
Contributionand the Distributionof Loss Among Tortfeasors, 25 Am. U.L. REv. 203, 237
(1975).
329. For cases applying this rule, see Buckley v. Basford, 184 F. Supp. 870 (D. Me.
1960); Smith v. Fenner, 399 Pa. 633, 161 A.2d 150 (1960); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Continental Casualty Co., 264 Wis. 493, 59 N.W.2d 425 (1953).
This method of loss distribution, adopted by the 1939 version of the Uniform Act,
see UNIF. ACT (1939), supra note 124, §§ 4-5, at 59-60, assures the injured plaintiff full
recovery and apportions liability according to each joint tortfeasor's fair share. Moreover,
this approach seems to protect nonsettling tortfeasors from a collusive or discriminatory
settlement that might result if the plaintiff could release a tortfeasor, thereby precluding
any action for contribution against that tortfeasor. See UNIF. ACT (1955), supra note 125,
§ 4 commissioners' comment to subsection (b), at 99. This rationale assumes that the
plaintiff may release one tortfeasor from paying a fair share of liability, while penalizing
another out of sympathy or spite, or because it may be easier to collect from one defendant than the other. Id. Further, this policy seems to limit the opportunity for collusion
between the plaintiff and the released tortfeasor, or among the other remaining
tortfeasors. Id. Reports from states adopting this policy, however, indicate that, in fact,
problems of collusion and discrimination remain. Id. The drafters of the 1955 Act noted:
In most three-paity cases two parties join hands against a third, and this ochttps://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol41/iss3/4
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defendant by reducing the total claim by the amount paid in settlement and denying contribution from the settling tortfeasor.3 3 0 The
third option shifts the loss to the plaintiff by reducing the claim
against the nonsettling tortfeasor by the released tortfeasor's pro rata
33 1
share.

curs even when the case goes to trial against both defendants. "Gentlemen's
agreements" are still made among lawyers, and the formal release is not at all
essential to them. If the plaintiff wishes to discriminate as to the defendants,
the 1939 provision does not prevent him from doing so.
Id.
Another drawback to this approach is that it inhibits settlement. Defendants have
no incentive to settle because they continue to be liable for contribution from another
action in which they will have no part. Also, under the 1939 Act, plaintiffs are required
to reduce the damages by the pro rata share of the released tortfeasor. See UNIF. AcT
(1939), supra note 124, §§ 4-5, at 57-58. Plaintiffs may wish to avoid such a release because they have no way of knowing in advance of judgment what they are giving up.
Furthermore, plaintiffs often settle with one tortfeasor rather than the other with the
hope that they will get more from the nonsettling party. UNIF. ACT (1955), supra note
125, § 4 commissioners' comment to subsection (b), at 99.
330. For cases applying this rule, see Florow v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. (In re
Waverly Accident of Feb. 22-24, 1978), 502 F. Supp. 1 (M.D. Tenn. 1979); Sobik's Sandwich Shops, Inc. v. Davis, 371 So. 2d 709 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); McNair v. Goodwin,
262 N.C. 1, 136 S.E.2d 218 (1964). This method of loss distribution is employed by the
1955 version of the Uniform Act. See UNIF. AcT (1955), supra note 125, § 4, at 98.
331. For cases applying this rule, see Theobald v. Angelos, 44 N.J. 228, 208 A.2d 129
(1965); Bartels v. City of Williston, 276 N.W.2d 113 (N.D. 1979). This method of loss
distribution is employed by the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. See UNIF. COMPARATIVE
FAULT AcT § 6, 12 U.L.A. 52 (Supp. 1989); see also Comment, Torts-The Right to Contribution and the One Satisfaction Rule: Credit for Settlement by Co-Defendant, 21
RUTGERS L. REV. 130 (1966); Note, Settlement With One Joint TortfeasorBars Recovery
Against Others of the Settling Tortfeasor'sProportionateShare of Damages, 19 Sw. L.J.
650 (1965). Under this approach, when a plaintiff settles with a tortfeasor, the release
reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors by at least the amount of the settling
tortfeasor's share of liability. For example, if the plaintiff settles with a tortfeasor who
would be responsible for one-third of the liability, his recovery against the remaining two
tortfeasors is limited to two-thirds of the total claim. No contribution is needed because
the released tortfeasor's share already has been subtracted from the amount the nonsettling tortfeasors owe. The 1939 Act provides this alternative if a clause is inserted in the
release reducing the recoverable damages by the pro rata share of the released tortfeasor.
See UNIF. ACT (1939), supra note 124, § 5, at 58. This approach also may be taken without the necessity of providing for it in the release. See Comment, supra note 328, at 241
n.145. For examples of this, see Martello v. Hawley, 300 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1962); McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Harvey v. Travelers Ins. Co., 163 So. 2d
915 (La. Ct. App. 1964); Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d 24
(1954); Garrison v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 74 N.M. 238, 392 P.2d 580 (1964).
One criticism of this method of loss distribution is that plaintiffs are denied full
recovery for their injuries. See Comment, supra note 71, at 241. This argument is rebuttable, however, since each plaintiff has made the decision to settle and thus voluntarily
has borne the risk. The nonsettling defendants should not be forced to assume an increased share merely because of the plaintiff's bad decision. The plaintiff, in other words,
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The 1939 Act adopted the first of these alternatives, but because it
tended to discourage settlements, the 1955 Act discarded that approach in favor of the second option.3 2 This approach, codified at
South Carolina Code section 15-38-50, 333 promotes settlement by releasing the settling defendant from further liability even if the defendant paid less than a fair share. The plaintiff can release a tortfeasor
and still recover the remaining loss from the nonsettling tortfeasors regardless of the
settlement amount, as long as the agreement was made
33
in good faith. 4

should have estimated the likelihood of success at trial before settling by considering
such factors "as the probability of any recovery, the probable size of the released party's
share and size of the verdict, and the cost of the litigation." Id. at 242 n.148. Consequently, the plaintiff-instead of a nonsettling tortfeasor who had no part in the decision-should bear any loss of the settlement.
Another criticism of this alternative is that it may discourage settlement in jurisdictions, like South Carolina, which apportion damages in equal shares, rather than according to degree of fault. For example, plaintiff P may be injured by the concurrent negligence of tortfeasors A and B: A is 90% negligent and B is 10% negligent. P may attempt
to settle the case with B against whom P has a weak case because of B's relatively small
amount of negligence. In order to protect against loss, P will need to seek a settlement
approximating B's 50% pro rate share. B, on the other hand, probably will not agree to
settle, in hopes of escaping all liability by litigating the controversy and convincing the
court of B's absence of negligence.
Settlement with tortfeasor A is just as unlikely. P will try to settle with A for nearly
the entire claim because P cannot afford to gamble one-half of the claim on a dubious
recovery from B. Conversely, A hopes B will be found at fault, which would reduce A's
liability from 90% to 50%. Turck, supra note 95, at 31-32. In jurisdictions in which
damages are apportioned on the basis of fault, these problems do not arise. Since settlement with B only reduces his later claim against A by 10%, P would negotiate with B
only for that amount-thus improving chances that B would agree to a settlement. Similarly, settlement with A for nearly the entire claim would be possible because A's claim
probably would not be reduced significantly by B's part in the injury. Id.
332. The comments to the 1955 Act state that "It]he effect of Section 5 of the 1939
Act has been to discourage settlements in joint tort cases, by making it impossible for
one tortfeasor alone to take a release and close the file." UNIF. ACT (1955), supra note
125, § 4 commissioners' comment to subsection (b), at 99.
333. This section provides:
When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is
given in good faith to one or two or more persons liable in tort for the same
injury or the same wrongful death:
(1) it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the
injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide, but it reduces the claim
against the others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the
covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the
greater; and
(2) it discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for
contribution to any other tortfeasor.
S,C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-50 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
334. For a more thorough discussion of the good faith standard, see infra text ac-
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On the other hand, the second alternative produces the same inequities that existed before contribution was allowed. 335 Nevertheless, the
justification for adopting this approach seems to be that the judicial
economy resulting from settlement outweighs these inequities.
None of the three alternatives is perfect. The 1955 Contribution
Act enacted in South Carolina, however, furthers a significant goal: settlement and judicial economy are encouraged without depriving full recovery to the injured plaintiff. Concededly, nonsettling joint tortfeasors
are exposed to greater liability than their pro rata shares. By raising
the stakes when a defendant is stubbornly unwilling to settle, however,
the Act is likely to result in overall improved fairness to the parties.
2. "Good Faith" Requirement for Release or Covenant Not to Sue
Section 4 of the 1955 Act,336 codified at South Carolina Code sec-

tion 15-38-50, 337 provides that when a settling tortfeasor receives in
"good faith" from the plaintiff a release or a covenant not to sue or not
to enforce judgment, the plaintiff's claim against the nonsettling
tortfeasors is reduced by "any amount stipulated by the release or the
covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever
is the greater.

' 33
1

Under this section, the most significant controversy

probably will arise when the settlement amount is substantially less

companying notes 336-57.
335. This alternative has been sharply criticized because of the inequities it produces. As one commentator notes:
This is not a solution at all; it frustrates the very purpose of contribution,
sacrificing the interests of justice and equity for mere expedience. Even the
benefit gained in encouraging settlements is of little value when only one party
is released from the litigation. For a trial may still be required and the burden
on both the plaintiff and the courts will be essentially the same regardless of
the number of defendants remaining in the suit. This scheme is inferior to
both of the alternative methods employed to reconcile settlement to the right
of contribution.
Comment, supra note 328, at 241.
336. UNIF. ACT (1955), supra note 125, § 4, at 98.
337. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-50 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). For the text of this statute, see supra note 333.
338. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-50(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). Arguably, since the
nonsettling tortfeasor has contributed to the plaintiff's injury, the plaintiff should be
favored over the nonsettling tortfeasor by reducing the nonsettling tortfeasor's share of
liability by the lesser of these two amounts or by forcing the nonsettling tortfeasor to
choose between the two amounts prior to submitting the case to the jury. See Herndon &
Israel, supra note 140, at 71. The South Carolina statute, however, precludes this proposal, placing the entire risk of loss on the nonsettling tortfeasor. This viewpoint acknowledges that the plaintiff has taken a chance by settling and that the nonsettling tortfeasor
should not bear the loss of the plaintiff's bad gamble. Id.
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than a verdict returned against one or more nonsettling tortfeasors.
According to the commissioners' comments, section 4 gives the court
the right in these circumstances to determine whether the settlement
between the plaintiff and the tortfeasor was collusive, and if so, to
deny discharge to the settling defendant." 9 To recover contribution
from the settling defendant, the tortfeasor seeking contribution, therefore, must allege that the settlement was not in good faith.340
The Uniform Act does not establish a procedure for determining
when a settlement agreement is entered into in good faith. The California Code of Civil Procedure, however, provides a procedure that allows
a party to seek a court order determining whether a settlement or a
proposed settlement is in good faith.341 A tortfeasor understandably
will want to be assured in advance that his settlement is in good faith
and therefore safe from later claims for contribution. Likewise, the settling tortfeasor may wish to make such a determination a condition of
342
the settlement agreement.

Although heavily litigated in other jurisdictions, the good faith issue rarely arises in states that have adopted the 1955 Act.34 3 Thus, no
bright-line rule has emerged from these cases. Instead, good faith depends on the particular facts of each case. In Sobik Sandwich Shops,
Inc. v. Davis3 4" the Florida District Court of Appeal found good faith

lacking in an agreement that was contingent upon whether the
tortfeasors appealed the judgment. The court stated:
[W]e believe that [the Contribution Act] prevents a claimant from arbitrarily deciding how much each tortfeasor will pay on the basis of

which tortfeasor has been more cooperative with claimant. There
must be some reasonable basis for the amount of the settlement with
the tortfeasors beyond the claimant's express desire to have those who
appeal pay and those who do not appeal be relieved of

339. UNit.AcT (1955), supra note 125, § 4 commissioners' comment to subsection
(b), at 99.
340, See, e.g., K Mart Corp. v. Chairs, Inc., 506 So. 2d 7, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987) (awarding summary judgment against party seeking contribution from settling
tortfeasors because party failed to allege lack of good faith).
341. See CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1990). The hearing usually is
requested by a tortfeasor who wishes to settle, although sometimes the plaintiff is the

moving party. See Roberts, The "Good Faith"Settlement: An Accommodation of Competing Goals, 17 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 841, 845 (1984).
342. See Roberts, supra note 341, at 845.
343. See, e.g., Florow v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. (In re Waverly Accident of Feb.
22-24, 1978), 502 F. Supp. 1 (M.D. Tenn. 1979); K Mart Corp., 506 So. 2d 7; Concrete
Sciences, Inc. v. Bassett, 449 So. 2d 300 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Sobik's Sandwich

Shops, Inc. v. Davis, 371 So. 2d 709 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
344. 371 So. 2d 709 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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responsibility.'4 5
As Sobik indicates, the good faith inquiry is not limited merely to
the amount of money paid in settlement of a claim. The court may well
look to other elements of fairness. For example, Floranv. Louisville &
34
Nashville Railroad (In re Waverly Accident of Feb. 22-24, 1978) 6
concerned an action brought by a widow whose husband was killed
when a railroad car containing gas ruptured as a result of a derailment.
The tortfeasor-railroad company negotiated a settlement with the
widow that required her to surrender a great measure of control over
settlement negotiations with other defendants.3 4 7 The court noted that
the Uniform Act. Commissioners pointed to collusion as the "prime motivator of the good faith clause,"' 345 but the court added that" 'the language of the clause is far broader. Lack of good faith encompasses
many kinds of behavior .... When profit is involved, the ingenuity of
man spawns limitless varieties of unfairness. Thus, formulation of a
precise definition of good faith is neither possible nor practicable.' ",349
The Waverly Accident court held that the purpose of the good
faith clause is to aid the twin statutory objectives of equitable sharing
of the burden of compensating the plaintiff and encouraging settlement. In determining that the agreement did not meet the good faith
standard, the court conceded that the amount of money paid to the
plaintiff was fair and, thus, met the first objective.3 50 Nevertheless, the
court held that both objectives must be met and that the agreement
failed to encourage settlement, stating: "[I]t would not advance the
broader policy of encouraging plaintiffs to settle their entire claims
with all tortfeasors, to reduce litigation, and to ease the burden on the
court."'33' Thus, Waverly Accident provides a clear warning to settling
tortfeasors that neither collusion nor the amount paid is the only test
that they must meet in order to avoid liability for contribution to non-

345. Id. at 711-12.
346. 502 F. Supp. 1 (M.D. Tenn. 1979).

347. The settlement imposed, inter alia, the following terms: (1) the widow could
not settle with any single defendant for less than a specified amount without the railroad's approval; and (2) she could not settle for more than such amount unless the railroad was willing to assume one-half of the responsibility of a guaranteed provision under
which she was would recover $100,000 if she pursued her claims against both the railroad
and one or more of the co-tortfeasors. Id. at 2-3.
348. Id. at 4.
349. Id. (quoting River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986,
103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1972)) (ellipsis in original).

350. The defendant-railroad paid $33,333.33 for the release. The court noted the
impossibility of determining in advance of trial what proportion the defendant should
pay. "Because of this very unpredictability, however, the court would be inclined to hold
that the amount of settlement is fair and sufficient." Id.
351. Id. at 5.
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settling tortfeasors.
California, whose courts have construed the good faith requirement more often and more thoroughly than any other jurisdiction, includes in its statute a provision virtually identical to South Carolina
Code section 15-38-50. 352 Early California contribution cases 353 adopted
a test that judged the good faith of a settlement agreement solely on
the basis of the amount paid in consideration of release. If the value
paid was within the reasonable range of the plaintiff's potential recovery, then it was deemed to have been made in good faith.354 Later decisions, however, established an approach de-emphasizing the amount
paid in settlement, focusing instead on the existence of collusion or
tortious intent on the part of the plaintiff and the settling defendant.3 5 California has returned, however, to a modified version of the
earlier "reasonable range" test: the settlement is in good faith only if
the settlement amount is within the reasonable range of the settling
tortfeasor's proportionate share of comparative liability for the plaintiff's injuries.35 The court in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & As-

352. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980). This section provides:
Where a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue
or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith before verdict or judgment to
one or more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same tort (a) It shall not discharge any other such tortfeasor from liability unless its
terms so provide, but it shall reduce the claims against the others in the
amount stipulated by the release, the dismissal or the covenant, or in the
amount of the consideration paid for it whichever is the greater; and
(b) It shall discharge the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for any
contribution to any other tortfeasors.
Id. (emphasis added).
353. See, eg., Lareau v. Southern Pac. Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 783, 118 Cal. Rptr. 837
(1975); River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr.
498 (1972).
354. See Roberts, supra note 341, at 854. For cases focusing on amount of settlement, see American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899,
146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978); River Garden Farms,26 Cal. App. 3d at 996, 103 Cal. Rptr. at
505 ("The price of a settlement is the prime badge of its good or bad faith.").
355. See Roberts, supra note 341, at 854. For an example of a case espousing this
policy, see Ford Motor Co. v. Schultz, 147 Cal. App. 3d 941, 195 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1983).
This rule has been criticized for its inequities, however. Professor Roberts, for example, notes:
Step by step, the appellate courts have moved away from a meaningful interpretation of the "good faith" concept. The cases built one upon the next, often
incorporating dicta from previous cases that made sense in the context of the
prior case but was inapplicable to the case at hand. Each case in turn established its own dicta to be followed by subsequent cases to the point that the
courts now feel bound by a rule that they acknowledge provides inequitable
results.
Roberts, supra note 341, at 855.
356. See, e.g., Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 499, 698
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socs. listed several factors to be considered in determining good faith,
including:
a rough approximation of plaintiffs' total recovery and the settlor's
proportionate liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation
of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial. Other relevant considerations include the financial
conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as well
as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants. Finally, practical consideraitons obviously require that the evaluation be made on the basis
of information available at the time of settlement." 7
The test resulting from these considerations is not without
problems. For instance, an exception should be made for the relatively
insolvent, uninsured, or underinsured tortfeasor 5 Because these classes of defendants obviously will have a severely diminished ability to
pay, a disproportionately low settlement figure often will be reasonable, even though it is disproportionate to the liability caused by their
conduct.

3. Settling Tortfeasors' Right to Contributionfrom a Nonsettling
Tortfeasor
Another, and perhaps more difficult, issue is whether a tortfeasor

who has settled with the plaintiff should be entitled to contribution
from nonsettling tortfeasors 5 9 Section 15-38-20(D) 3 0 of the South
Carolina Contribution Act follows the course established in the 1939
Uniform Act" 1 and retained by the 1955 revised version.32 The South
Carolina Act provides:
A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not enti-

P.2d 159, 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 263 (1985).
357. Id. at 499, 698 P.2d at 166-67, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263 (citation omitted).
358. See generally Roberts, The Relatively Insolvent Joint Tortfeasor and the
Good FaithSettlement, 20 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 247 (1987) (advocating a modification of the

California test for the insolvent, uninsured, and underinsured tortfeasors). Appellate
courts interpreting Tech-Bilt have determined that this class of tortfeasors should be an
exception from the reasonable range test. See, e.g., Standard Pac. v. A.A. Baxter Corp.,
176 Cal. App. 3d 577, 582-93, 222 Cal. Rptr. 106, 108-09 (1986); Sagadin v. Ripper, 175
Cal. App. 3d 1141, 1177, 221 Cal. Rptr. 675, 698-99 (1985); Barth-Wittmore Ins. Co. v.
H.R. Murphy Enters., 169 Cal. App. 3d 124, 134, 214 Cal. Rptr. 894, 899-900 (1985).
359. See W. PROSSER, supra note 325, at 308.
360. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-20(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
361. See UNIF. AcT (1939), supra note 124, § 2(3), at 57.
362. See UNIF. AcT (1955), supra note 125, § 1(d), at 65.
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tled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for
the injury or wrongful death is not extinguished by the settlement nor
in respect to any amount
paid in a settlement which is in excess of
3 63
what was reasonable.

Thus, the following two requirements must be established before a
settling tortfeasor may recover contribution from a nonsettling defendant: (1) the settlement agreement must extinguish the nonsettling
tortfeasor's liability; and (2) the settlement amount must be reasonable. The settling tortfeasor seeking contribution from an alleged cotortfeasor whose liability is extinguished by the settlement must plead
and prove that the co-tortfeasor is jointly negligent 364 and that the settlement amount was not in excess of what is reasonable. Generally a
settling tortfeasor establishes a prima facia case by showing common
liability, proving that the settlement was made, and showing its
amount. 36 5 The burden then shifts to the co-tortfeasor to show "the
nonexistence of any fact essential or necessary to establish that he was
liable at the time to the injured person, or he may show that the
amount paid by the settlement was not paid in good faith or was un-

reasonable or excessive."368
Since few jurisdictions that have adopted the 1955 Act have been
faced with the issue of reasonableness of the settlement, South Carolina courts are left with little guidance in this area. The South Carolina
courts might, however, follow the test advocated by a Florida District
3 7
Court of Appeal in Home Insurance Co. v. Advance Machine Co.,6

which looked to non-1955 Act cases dealing with the reasonableness of

363. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-20(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
364. See Beaches Hosp. v. Lee, 384 So. 2d 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
365. See 18 Am.Ju. 2D Contribution § 127 (1985); see also Consolidated Coach
Corp. v. Burge, 245 Ky. 631, 54 S.W.2d 16 (1932) (prima facie right to contribution
against a joint tortfeasor existed when compromise and settlement was made in good
faith for reasonable amount with few of the injured parties).
366. 18 AM.Jun. 2D Contribution § 127, at 145 (1985) (emphasis added); see Travelers Ins. Co. v. United States, 283 F. Supp. 14, 31 (S.D. Tex. 1968). Of course, South
Carolina Code section 15-38-20(D) does not contain a "good faith" requirement, only a
reasonableness requirement. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-20(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989)
The use of the reasonableness test indicates a greater concern with the amount of the
settlement in relation to the liability, rather than with the collusiveness of the parties in
reaching the agreement. Section 15-38-50, however, attaches a good faith requirement to
settlement agreements that limit a nonsettling tortfeasors right to obtain contribution
from a settling tortfeasor. See supra notes 336-58 and accompanying text. As noted earlier, courts interpreting section 15-38-50 look beyond the amount of the settlement in
ascertaining if the settlement was in good faith. See supra notes 344-58 and accompanying text. By contrast, the language of section 15-38-20, on its face, seems to support a
more objective test of the settlement as opposed to an examination of the motivations
behind it.
367. 443 So. 2d 165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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settlement.2 6 In Home Insurance the Florida court considered the validity of a settlement agreement challenged on reasonableness grounds.
The nonsettling tortfeasor urged that the issue of reasonableness was
to be determined on the basis of objective factors only.
The court agreed that objective factors were to be included in the
test, but stated that the test is what a " ' reasonab l y prudent person in
the position of the defendant would have settled for on the merits of
plaintiff's claim.' ,"69 Thus, only certain objective factors-such as the
extent of the plaintiff's injuries, his past, present, and future medical
expenses, his age and ability to work-should be considered.370 On the
other hand, the opinion also sanctioned the weighing of certain subjective factors-such as degree of certainty of the tortfeasor's probable
liability, the risk of going to trial, and the chances of the jury verdict
exceeding the settlement offer. 37 ' Although the Act does not state what
result follows a finding that the settlement amount was unreasonable,
the Home Insurance court held that if the co-tortfeasor successfully
proves that the settlement amount was unreasonable or excessive, his
liability for contribution is reduced to a pro rata share of the amount
72
that a jury would find reasonable.3

The Uniform Act's provision regarding a settling tortfeasor's right
to contribution from a nonsettling tortfeasor is designed to encourage
settlement and to treat fairly the plaintiff as well as settling and nonsettling tortfeasors. The commissioners' comment to this provision
states:
The policy of the Act is to encourage rather than discourage settlements. The tortfeasor who settles removes himself entirely from the
case so far as contribution is concerned if he is able and chooses to
buy his peace for less than the entire liability. If he discharges the
entire obligation it is only fair to give him contribution from those
whose liability he has discharged. Since the settlement must be reasonable it follows that the question of total liability to the injured
party may be litigated in the contribution action. 373
This provision, however, raises several troubling issues. For example, if a settling tortfeasor obtains contribution from a nonsettling
tortfeasor, the nonsettling tortfeasor may have no input into the settle-

368. See Stevens v. East West Towing Co., 470 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. La. 1979), rev'd

on other grounds, 649 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1981); Miller v. Shugart, 316 N.W.2d 729
(Minn. 1982).
369. Home Ins., 443 So. 2d at 168 (quoting Miller, 316 N.W.2d at 735).
370. Id.
371. Id. at 168-69.
372. Id. at 169; see Young v. Steinberg, 53 N.J. 252, 255, 250 A.2d 13, 14-15 (1969).
373. UNIF. AcT (1955), supra note 125, § 1 commissioners' comment to subsection
(d), at 65.
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ment, strongly oppose it, and yet still be held liable for a share. Consequently, some jurisdictions limit contribution to cases in which a joint
37 4
judgment, which fixes both liability and amount, has been entered.
In some situations, limiting the right to contribution to judgment defendants produces the same inequities that resulted from the no-contribution rule 7 This limitation also may discourage settlement. For
example, under the third alternative discussed above, the plaintiff's
claim against the nonsettling tortfeasor normally will be reduced by
the settling defendant's share of liability. On the other hand, if the
settlement amount is greater than the settling tortfeasor's share, most
jurisdictions reduce the plaintiff's claim against the remaining
tortfeasor by the actual amount of settlement in order to prevent a
windfall to the tort victim. 37 6 Under this scenario, the nonsettling
tortfeasors clearly benefit by the settlement. To deny the settling
tortfeasor contribution in this situation would be as inequitable as denying contribution to a tortfeasor who pays more than his share of a
judgment. Moreover, a tortfeasor may be wary of entering into a settlement agreement which requires payment of more than the tortfeasor's
fair share of liability.
III.

CONCLUSION

The right to contribution now exists in South Carolina, but many
questions of interpretation remain. The courts and practitioners must
determine the procedures by which the right can be asserted, as well as
the parties who are subject to and entitled to the right. In resolving
these issues, the courts should bear in mind the underlying purposes of
the Act, and should learn from the interpretations of the Act in other
jurisdictions.

374. See, e.g., Maryland v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)
(applying New York law); Buckner v. Foster, 105 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Mich. 1952) (applying Michigan law); Kahn v. Urania Lumber Co., 103 So. 2d 476 (La. Ct. App. 1958); State
ex rel. McClure v. Dinwiddie, 358 Mo. 15, 213 S.W.2d 127 (1948).
375. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
376. See, e.g., Snowden v. D.C. Transit Sys., Inc., 454 F.2d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659, 665-66 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Garrison v. Navajo Freight
Lines, Inc., 74 N.M. 238, 392 P.2d 580 (1964). In Snowden the court set forth the policy
behind this rule: "A cardinal principle of law is that in absence of punitive damages a
plaintiff can recover no more than the loss actually suffered ....
The purpose of this
rule-prevention of unjust enrichment-has been invoked by this court on several occa-

sions." Snowden, 454 F.2d at 1048.
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